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Abstract 
This article gives a general understanding of decentralisation focusing on 
the context in which decentralisation is planned and implemented. A 
conceptualisation of the ‘African state’ is developed and analysed in order 
to understand the difficulties in applying a European concept in an African 
context. A case study of regional planning in the Erongo region is used to 
illustrate how the decentralisation process in Namibia is influenced by the 
African state in terms of the pace and direction of decentralisation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is the result of my internship at the Erongo Regional Council1 in 
Namibia, as part of the ninth semester of the Master’s programme in 
International Development Studies – and involves a study of the 
decentralisation in Namibia.  
 
The Namibian government launched a “Decentralisation Policy” in March 1998 
designed to enhance and guarantee participatory democracy, improve rapid 
sustainable development as well as improve the capacity of the government to 
plan and administrate the development (MRLGH 1998:5). The overall theme of 
the “Decentralisation Policy” is democracy and development.  
 
In the following year after the launch, new structures were established at the 
regional level down to the local level, in the shape of local committees 
involving the different parties, and not least the local community in the regional 
planning (MRLGH 1998:25-8). Initiatives were taken by the central 
government to transfer some of the planning functions and decision-making to 
                                                           
* Current master’s student at the Research Centre on Development and International Relations 
(DIR), Aalborg University, Denmark. 
1 Namibia is divided into thirteen Regional Councils, recently established in 1992 with the purpose 
of co-ordinating the overall development within the region. The Erongo Regional Council Office is, 
if one should draw a parallel to the Danish system, basically the same as a Danish Amt with similar 
responsibilities such as health, education and environment within the region. The Regional 
Councils together with the Local Authorities respectively constitute the second and third tier of the 
government structure in Namibia. 
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the lower levels. The whole idea of decentralisation was to make the Regional 
Council the overall coordinating body regarding development within the 
region, which besides coordinating the input from the Local Authorities and the 
Line Ministries, also had to manage the input from the people living in the 
urban and rural areas (ARC 1997). This new decentralised structure would 
enable the people living in urban areas and particularly those living in rural 
areas to participate through various community committees in matters related to 
the future development of their communities. 
 
This paper examines the current situation of the decentralisation process in 
Namibia, as decentralisation in Namibia is still an ongoing process. It is based 
on a case study of regional planning in Erongo with a focus on community 
participation in the rural areas. The study can be divided into three questions, 
namely:  
 
1. What is the situation concerning the transfer of planning, decision-
making and administrative authority from the central government to 
the regional government in Erongo?  
2. How are the local communities in the rural areas incorporated in the 
decentralised structures?  
3. How has the local community responded so far to the new “political 
role” as decision-makers on local matters?  
 
In other words, what are the possibilities for participation, and is there a will to 
participate among the communities?  
 
These questions are attached to the question of how the decentralisation process 
has proceeded so far. This leads to another important question, namely, why has 
the decentralisation process proceeded the way it has? Examining the latter 
question is maybe more important in order to achieve an understanding of the 
current situation regarding the decentralisation process in Namibia, which is 
why both questions will be studied in this paper. 
 
The decentralisation process in Namibia is interesting to study, because a new 
relation between the state and civil society must be established. This way of 
doing politics is not seen earlier in the history of Namibia due to the German 
military colonial rule, which was followed by South Africa’s apartheid rule 
(Pisani 1986:23-35, 52-63). Furthermore, the general experience with African 
countries and decentralisation is that it is difficult to transfer functions from the 
central government to the regional and local governments, since 
decentralisation is about distribution of power (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1996:81). 
Regardless of the degree of decentralisation, mobilisation and participation of 
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the people is more difficult than imagined. Some authors would even claim that 
it has more to do with rhetoric than reality (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1996:81). 
In the following part, the theoretical framework is presented which links the 
concept of decentralisation to the political setting in which it is planned and 
implemented. In this case, it is linked to a conceptualisation of the ‘African 
state’, which is deduced from the foremost common features of the African 
states. The case study of regional planning in Erongo is subsequently presented. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION 
Decentralisation is just a policy, which depends on the degree and the form of 
decentralisation, and not least the political setting from which the 
decentralisation policy emerges. This is important in order to understand the 
constraints and opportunities for the implementing organisations to translate 
policies into actions (Rondinelli 1983:27). 
 
The general definition of decentralisation is: 
 
 “... a transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority 
from the central government to its field organisation, local government, 
or NGO’s”  
(Rondinelli 1983:18)  
 
The definition is very broad, however most refer to the four major forms of 
decentralisation, namely: devolution, deconcentration, delegation and 
privatisation. Devolution is considered to be the most extensive form of 
decentralisation, and involves a transfer of functions and authority to local units 
of government which are autonomous, meaning their activities are substantially 
outside the direct control of the central government and only bounded by the 
broad national policy guidelines (The Norwegian Institute of Urban and 
Regional Research 1997:19). This form of decentralised structure invites a 
greater amount of participation, and is referred to by some authors as 
democratic decentralisation due to the more open political forum (Mawhood 
1983:3). Deconcentration, contrary to devolution, is about a redistribution of 
selected functions and authority to lower levels within the central government, 
which are situated outside headquarters (Rondinelli 1983:18). The decision-
making is settled internally within the administration, where the delegated 
authority can be altered or withdrawn (Mawhood 1983a:1). Delegation is a 
transfer of selected administrative functions to organisations that are not under 
the direct control of the central government ministries (Huda 1996:113). 
Deconcentration and delegation are more associated with bureaucratic or 
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administrative decentralisation than political decentralisation (Mawhood 
1983:3). The motive for choosing these two forms of decentralisation is 
effectiveness and efficiency rather than democracy (Hyden 1983:86). Finally, 
privatisation is a form of decentralisation where the central government 
transfers some of its planning and administrative responsibilities to volunteers 
or NGO’s (Rondinelli 1983:24).  
 
These forms of decentralisation are all associated with some kind of a transfer 
of functions from the central government to either lower units of the 
government, NGO’s or other organisations. However, the degree of 
decentralisation varies, which in turn has different impacts on the government 
structure, the political structure, the amount of community participation and the 
preconditions for successful implementation (Rondinelli 1983:25). 
 
The four forms of decentralisation do not exist in their pure form, which makes 
the use of the above definitions complicated and stereotypical when studying 
decentralisation. This is why Conyers (1986:89), a recognised author within 
this field, suggests that instead of focussing on the different forms of 
decentralisation, one should start examining: 
  
1. the functional activities over which authority is transferred;  
2. the type of authority or powers which are transferred with respect to 
each functional activity; 
3. the level(s) or area(s) to which such authority or power is transferred; 
4. the individual, organisation or agency to which authority or power is 
transferred at each level and; 
5. the legal or administrative means by which authority or power is 
transferred. 
 
This approach gives a better understanding of the concept of decentralisation, 
as well as a more meaningful way of studying and measuring the different 
degrees of decentralisation, than just comparing the different policies to the 
four major forms of decentralisation. Conyers also focuses on the distribution 
of power: policy-making power, financial power and power of personnel 
matters (Conyers 1986:94). It is important to identify all three types of power 
when studying decentralisation, as the three types of power are interrelated. For 
example, it is often seen in less developed countries that both regional and local 
governments have planning authority, but because of the lack of control or 
access over financial powers or personnel powers, the planning authority 
becomes ineffectual (Conyers 1986:94).  
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ASSUMPTIONS SURROUNDING DECENTRALISATION AND PARTICIPATION 
Participation is often mentioned in connection with decentralisation and vice 
versa. It is a well known assumption that decentralisation enhances popular 
participation, since decentralised structures create a more open political forum 
for planning and decision-making (Conyers 1986:92). Participation is therefore 
one of many objectives associated with decentralisation, but participation is 
also considered an important means to achieve both administrative and political 
objectives (Marsden 1991:29). The latter is important to note. Participation is 
often a precondition for administrative and political objectives to succeed. For 
instance, it is believed that community participation2 in terms of participation in 
the appraisal, implementation and evaluation of a development project is 
beneficial for the effectiveness and efficiency of the project (Marsden 
1991:30). In connection with decentralisation, participation can be described as 
both a means to an end, and an end in itself (Marsden 1991:29), which makes 
participation an important part of decentralisation. 
 
LIMITATIONS TO DECENTRALISATION AND PARTICIPATION  
The extent and thriving of community participation depends on the transfer of 
the different powers and how the local community is incorporated in the 
decentralised structure. This is because community participation is mostly an 
idea generated from decentralisation policies, which are initiated entirely at the 
national level, and not requested by the lower units of the government or the 
people themselves (Conyers 1986:92).  
 
There are several barriers for successful implementation of decentralisation. 
One of the main barriers is lack of political commitment from the central 
government to transfer sufficient power to the local and regional governments, 
since doing so would reduce their own power.  This generally limits the impact 
of decentralisation including community participation (Huda 1996:115). 
Decentralisation is, like many other development concepts, a European 
concept3 based on the experience, norms, and value systems of European 
countries (Brown 1995:2-4). Throughout the history of development, European 
concepts and norms have been imposed and applied to solve the 
“underdevelopment” of Africa without any noticeable improvement (Leys 
1996:188-196). Lately, it has become a well-known fact that African countries 
                                                           
2 Community participation has been defined as a process by which the different groups in the 
community are involved with the appraisal, implementation and evaluation of a development 
project with the view of enhancing their well being in terms of income, personal growth, self-
reliance or other values.  
3 Decentralisation was used in the 1950’s and 1960’s in Europe to deal with the rapid growth of the 
welfare state, which left the central government unable to satisfy the expectation of increased 
responsibilities (Hyde 1983:84). 
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have a unique history, and that they differ from European countries in various 
ways such as culturally and in terms of social structure. This makes it difficult 
to apply European concepts to an African context (Brown 1995:3).  
 
THE AFRICAN STATE 
After studying the development of Africa for some time, Goran Hyden has 
made a general conceptualisation of a typical African state, in which he 
describes the main features and their influence on how the state functions 
(Hyden 1983). It is within this context decentralisation should be seen. 
 
THE STATE STRUCTURE 
The African state is, first of all, known for being a ‘socialist state’ associated 
with a central planning bureaucracy (Hyden 1983:51-2). After independence, 
African leaders/governments were in favour of socialism, because capitalism 
was associated with the colonial powers and their economic system which was 
imposed on African countries ((Hyden 1983:1). During the 1980s, there were 
some attempts to minimise the state’s influence on the economy and 
depoliticise other sectors (Hyden 1983:3). However, the African state has been 
about central planning and decision-making up until now, that is, until the 
recent introduction of  decentralisation policies. 
 
THE POLITICAL CULTURE 
There are distinct differences between the political culture of African and 
European countries. Most African countries are ruled by a single party, often 
with a charismatic leader in front and usually without any opposition (Hyden 
1983:33). In this one party system, there is a large concentration of power. 
Political affiliation to the party is demographic, meaning that certain tribes or 
clans located in a part or parts of the country belong to the party (Hyden 
1983:37). The different clans have great influence in society, since there is no 
ruling class. A clan can be described as: 
 
“[...] a political faction, operating within the institutions of the state and 
the government party: it exists above all to promote the interests of its 
members through political competition, and its first unifying principle is 
the prospect of the material rewards of political success. Political office 
and the spoils of office are the very definition of success: loot is the 
clanic totem.” 
(O’Brien 1975:149)  
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This cultural phenomenon exists in various degrees throughout Africa, and the 
general aim for clan leaders in Africa is to benefit from political office and 
allocate resources and income to their own members. African politics is 
therefore not about allocation of public goods as we know it, but about getting 
the most public goods as possible (Hyden 1983:39). 
 
The strong existence of clans in African society has made it necessary for 
African leaders to incorporate clan leaders in the government, which limits 
room for popular participation (Hyden 1983:48). However, the need for 
organisation and mobilisation of civil society in political matters is at the same 
time little, because the clans attend to their interests (Hyden 1983:35). The 
unions and other interest groups are therefore more or less invisible in the 
political arena where clans and individuals set the agenda. It is therefore not a 
surprise that in most of these African states participation by civil society has 
not yet been institutionalised (Hyden 1983:35). 
 
The above description of the political culture differs distinctly from that in 
Europe, due to some existing cultural and social relations in African societies, 
which are reinforced by a peculiar type of economy, namely, ‘economics of 
affection’. This has affected the economic and social organisation in Africa, 
including the African state (Hyden 1983:37). This type of economy is 
especially prevalent in the rural communities, though it is an integrated part of 
society and political life more generally (Hyden 1983:9). An economy of 
affection is characterised by a person’s or household unit’s exchange of goods 
to another person in order to secure the physical and social maintenance of the 
person or household, whereby a patron-client relation occurs. An economy of 
affection can be defined as: 
 
“[...] a network of support groups, communications and interactions 
among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community 
or other affinities for example religion. It links together in a systematic 
fashion a variety of discrete economic and social units which in other 
regards may be autonomous.”  
(Hyden 1983:82) 
 
This network is often ad hoc and informal rather than regular and formalised. 
This type of economy, or network, complements the operation of the clan and 
vice versa. The tradition in African politics is to make use of public resources 
in order to “cut a deal”, which is a result of the earlier mentioned patronage 
IJIS Volume 1
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  NO.1 (2003) 
8 
politics.4 The African state bureaucracy is used to accommodating competing 
clan interests, and is often portrayed as a ‘soft state’, due to its sensitivity 
towards clan pressures that occur from the use of an economy of affection 
(Hyden 1983:69). 
 
Politics in the African state therefore are much more based on personal 
networks and power than institutionalised processes, in which the different 
stakeholders including civil society are represented. The African state is known 
for having a little but powerful political elite, with strong reference to their 
clans, who conduct the decision-making. The African state, therefore differs 
from a western understanding of a state. When applying political or 
administrative concepts to the African state one must be aware of these 
differences. 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF REGIONAL PLANNING IN 
ERONGO  
The theoretical understanding of the current situation of regional planning in 
Erongo with respect to community participation is that the political setting, i.e. 
the political structure and culture in Namibia, has influenced the 
decentralisation process, and the reasons for this are found in the political 
setting. The African state, often a new democracy, is based on a single party 
rule with strong references to the clans, which makes the structure of the state 
so different from the European model. It is in this political setting that 
decentralisation is planned and implemented. The context in which 
decentralisation occurs is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
As illustrated, the African state is influenced by the historical setting as well as 
the surrounding African society, which also indirectly influences the 
decentralisation process. 
 
                                                           
4 The purpose of patronage politics is to secure, insure and protect certain interests, for instance, a 
clan’s. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
It is quite obvious that the implementation of decentralisation in the African 
state requires a new way of doing politics in terms of intergovernmental 
relations, institutionalisation of the state and new political actors. It is therefore 
presumable that those holding power and benefiting from it will meet the 
changes, like others, with suspicion and maybe an unwillingness to support 
these new political changes. The institutionalisation of the African state 
regarding administrative and political processes will likewise become a 
challenge, considering the often informal and ad hoc structures that dominate 
the African state due to the economy of affection. Furthermore, the historical 
background of African countries, the single rule party and other prevailing 
features of the African state have more or less excluded civil society from 
political matters, which makes it difficult to mobilise community participation. 
In other words, it is rather difficult to implement decentralisation in this 
political setting, because at some point decentralisation will undermine the 
prevailing political structure and culture in which the elite has gained their 
power. Decentralisation is therefore not a blueprint that guarantees democracy 
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and development regardless of where in the world it is implemented:  
 
“In the end every country has to find a form of decentralisation which is 
adapted to its own political culture and circumstances, and there is no 
standard model to imitate”.  
(Mawhood 1991:53)  
 
The concept of decentralisation is a European concept in an African context 
and, due to a different set of circumstances, decentralisation cannot be expected 
to proceed as it did in Europe.  
 
CASE STUDY OF REGIONAL PLANNING IN ERONGO  
THE CURRENT SITUATION OF REGIONAL PLANNING IN ERONGO  
The regional planning process starts with the Settlement Committee (SC), the 
lowest political level in Namibia, which identifies and evaluates local 
needs/problems and monitors the different development projects. The SC 
reports to the Constituency Development Committee (CDC), whose tasks do 
not differ from the SC’s. It just operates at the constituency level and reports to 
the Regional Council. However, it is the Regional Development Coordinating 
Committee (RDCC) which coordinates the overall development in the region 
(MRLGH 1998a:47). The regional planning is approved by the Regional 
Council and the Governor, who submits the plan to the National Planning 
Commission (NPC), which in the end determines the priorities and direction of 
Namibia’s development. 
 
However, regional planning has not taken form as hoped. The lower level of 
the decentralised structure is rather weak, and not nearly as established as 
desired (Larsen 2002:41). The CDC’s are on the other hand quite well 
established, but cooperation between the different members, e.g. government 
agencies, sector ministries, Local Authorities and NGO’s in the area, is lacking, 
which hinders them in coming up with serious suggestions for a development 
plan for the constituency (Ibid.:42). The RDCC has the same problem. Most of 
the general planning is, at some point, still conducted by the Line Ministries 
and the Local Authorities, which makes it difficult to integrate any 
development proposals coming from the SCs, CDCs, and Regional Council 
(Ibid.:43). The new decentralised structure is more used to implement national 
policies and is more a top-down than bottom-up planning. The possibilities for 
community participation in the regional planning are rather limited, given that 
most SCs are not established yet. Together with the fact that the RDCC in 
Erongo is not functioning leaves the communities without any influence on 
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regional planning. Many people living in the settlements are still not aware of 
the decentralisation policies and the new structure which enables them to 
participate (Larsen 2002:44). 
 
DECENTRALISATION IN NAMIBIA 
In order for regional planning to function, a transfer of political, administrative, 
legislative, planning and not least financial authority from the central to the 
regional level is necessary. The government preferred devolution as the 
decentralisation model in Namibia, though admitting that decentralisation is a 
long-term process starting with delegation and then devolution (MRLGH 
1997:13).  
 
Starting with the transfer of functions, only few functions were transferred, 
which made it difficult for the Regional Council to successfully plan and 
coordinate development in the region, when most of the various functions were 
still the responsibility of the Line Ministries. The personnel decentralisation or 
powers of personnel has partly taken place in the shape of adequate numbers of 
staff, but personnel with skilled expertise and experienced have not been 
transferred (Larsen 2002:47-8). They are still positioned in the central 
government and its Line Ministries, which has made regional planning more 
challenging than necessary. Regarding financial powers, it is evident that 
funding of the decentralisation process has not taken place. The Erongo 
Regional Council is still dependent on the central government to fund the 
different project (Drake 2000:iv). This naturally affects the development 
planning in the region at all levels, hence the Regional Council lacks financial 
means to realise their development plans. Furthermore, the little political power 
that has been transferred to the Regional Council has, due to the lack of both 
personnel and financial decentralisation, had a limited effect (Larsen 2002:50). 
The Erongo Regional Council may prioritise and make a development strategy 
at its monthly meeting, but in order to realise this, the Council depends on the 
central government. As a result, most of the decentralised policy-making in 
Erongo tends to be advisory at all levels. 
 
After having identified the different functions, powers, levels of authority and 
legal means regarding decentralisation in Namibia, exemplified by the Erongo 
region, it is obvious that the form of decentralisation taking place is delegation. 
This does not come as a surprise, since the Ministry of Regional, Local 
Government Housing (MRLGH) declared that the first phase of the 
decentralisation process would begin with a delegation of functions. What is 
surprising is the low degree of delegation. It is evident that Regional Councils 
are under the control of the central government. 
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The pace and direction of the first phase of the decentralisation process, which 
one day might become devolution, has not proceeded as planned.  This leads us 
to the question: why has the decentralisation process proceeded the way it has? 
 
THE POLITICAL SETTING IN NAMIBIA 
The “Decentralisation Policy” was planned and implemented in a centralised 
state structure. The central government and the Line Ministries carried out all 
the policy-making and the implementation with the help of some well-
established Local Authorities. The Regional Councils were added to the 
government structure in 1992 and, compared to the Local Authorities, were not 
nearly as economically resourceful, experienced nor educated. The 
establishment of the Regional Councils, therefore, demanded an exceptional 
effort and support by those who were involved in the decentralisation process. 
 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
After independence in 1990, the South West Africa Peoples Organisation 
(SWAPO), a liberation movement transformed into a political party which most 
of the population supported, ruled Namibia (Tötemeyer 2000:105). Like many 
other single rule parties, SWAPO had a tendency to keep the power within the 
members, and at the time of independence, members of SWAPO were in favour 
of promoting their own interests in terms of political power and material 
rewards (Tötemeyer 2000:100). In fact members of SWAPO did not approve of 
the plans for decentralisation, even though it seems so in the different official 
government publications (Ibid.:100). The regions and Regional Councils were a 
compromise between SWAPO and the opposition during the drafting of the 
Constitution (Ibid.:95) - the opposition at that time was more powerful than 
today (Pisani 1996:34). One of the main reasons for not supporting these 
Regional Councils was the fear of becoming a federation. 
 
THE TENDENCY TO PATRONAGE POLITICS 
The members of SWAPO still believed in the all-power party after 
independence, where government power had to be based on party patronage 
and ruled untouchable by any constitutional arrangement, which should make 
the party superior to the national Constitution (Tötemeyer 2000:100). Because 
of this attitude, the rationales for doing politics in Namibia were inevitably 
associated with some kind of clan or patronage politics, since many of the 
politicians and officials were members of SWAPO. Namibia was therefore at 
some point too exposed to the patronage politics, which reinforced the 
“economy of affection” in the civil service in Namibia (Pisani 1996:30). 
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Though the clan phenomenon existed in Namibia, it had not advanced to the 
stage of a corrupt, unrepresentative and kleptocratic state. However, some 
public incidents regarding mismanagement have occurred, which can be linked 
to the national level (Pisani 1996:33). The image of the state as being an 
obstacle to distributive democracy and development is therefore prevalent in 
Namibia (Tötemeyer 2000:108). Hence, the demand for economic satisfaction 
in terms of self-enrichment exists side by side with the desire for democracy 
(Tötemeyer 2000:105). 
 
THE LACK OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT  
Up until the launch of the “Decentralisation Policy”, there was a wish in 
SWAPO to keep power within the party or the clan, which wanted to profit 
from the political office and promote the interests of its members and do 
politics in the traditional way. SWAPO was far from ready to distribute powers 
to the lower governments or any other organisation. In fact SWAPO never 
approved of the idea of Regional Councils and decentralisation. After having 
fought so long for independence SWAPO was not about to lose the power once 
gained, and the last thing SWAPO wished to promote were separate political 
and administrative areas which were created during the apartheid era. 
Furthermore, if decentralisation was to be implemented, it would undermine 
SWAPO’s way of doing politics. 
 
The MRLGH and the NPC were the leading national agencies in Namibia and 
had the responsibility of promoting, strengthening and facilitating sustainable 
regional planning (NPC 1997:19); but it has not been an easy task, given that 
the political commitment and support have been lacking, especially from the 
other Line Ministries.  
 
The lack of political support is one of the main reasons for the slow pace of the 
decentralisation process in Namibia. For instance, the Act that entails a clear 
division of responsibilities and procedures between the government units and 
enables financial transfer to take place, has been in motion for a long time but 
not passed yet despite pressure from many stakeholders both inside and outside 
the government (Tötemeyer 2000:97). This delay of constitutional and legal 
provisions of decentralisation has affected the regional planning in every 
possible way. As for the direction of decentralisation in Namibia, it was 
outlined as devolution starting with delegation, but the extent of delegation 
along with the capacity building of the Regional Councils have been relatively 
low compared to the original plan, and the lack of political commitment is 
obvious through the failed attempt to delegate. 
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COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN NAMIBIA  
The slow pace and the low degree of decentralisation in Namibia have made it 
more difficult to mobilise community participation. Civil society has never 
been strong in Namibia, given the country’s history of colonisation. Namibia 
became South Africa’s protectorate in 1919, and the government extended its 
laws to Namibia, including the racial laws (Tötemeyer 1987). Today, the 
centralised structure, along with the strong political elite with reference to the 
clan, leaves little room for civil society to participate. Up until now, there have 
been few initiatives to include the ordinary people in the matters. The spin off 
effect of community participation has therefore been rather limited. For one, 
the political, financial and personnel powers which should have supported the 
work of the different committees, including mobilisation of the people to 
participate in different projects, have not been transferred to the regional level. 
Secondly, the people living in the settlement areas are not fully aware of the 
decentralisation policy and the work of the SCs. This makes it difficult to 
mobilise participation with respect to implementation and evaluation of the 
development projects. 
 
The general conclusion of the case study is that the lack of political 
commitment has stalled the decentralisation process, which has affected the 
work of the Regional Councils and made it rather impossible for the regional 
planning, including community participation, to function. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Decentralisation has become the new development concept which most African 
countries, due to the last decades of democratisation, have encountered with the 
hope of obtaining sustainable democratic development. Namibia, which is a 
relatively new democracy, wanted to improve the participatory democracy and 
development of the country, and saw decentralisation as an instrument to 
achieve these objectives. However, most governments tend to forget that:  
 
“[…] greater decentralisation does not necessarily imply greater 
democracy let alone “power to the people”. It all depends on the 
circumstances under which decentralisation occurs”.  
(Rondinelli 1983:17)  
 
Decentralisation is therefore far from a guarantee for participatory democracy 
or development, which the Erongo case illustrates very well.  
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The study of the decentralisation process in Namibia has shown that the 
Namibian state is based on different values and norms, i.e. the clan 
phenomenon, patronage politics and economy of affection, which makes the 
Namibian state function somewhat differently from what we know. It is 
therefore unrealistic to expect that decentralisation in Namibia would have the 
same outcome as in Europe at this time. The decentralisation process in 
Namibia has so far illustrated very well that decentralisation is a European 
concept in an African context. Most African states are not nearly as established 
as western states, and are non-institutionalised, which makes it even more 
complicated to apply the decentralisation concept to the African state.  
 
However, considering that decentralisation is a relatively new concept in a 
relatively new democracy the regional planning and community participation is 
functioning as well as can be expected. The decentralisation process in Namibia 
is still an ongoing process, and there is still a long way to go for the Namibian 
government, if devolution is the final aim. The Deputy Minister of the Regional 
Local Government Housing predicts that it will be implemented in 2030 
(Tötemeyer 2000:101). 
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Abstract 
The article attempts to provide a theoretical framework of international 
socialisation that helps initiate a security community-pattern of relationship 
in the Balkans, in its process of Euro-Atlantic accession. It focuses on the 
interaction between "ideas" and "institutions", and their import for the 
international socialisation of the Balkans. However, it delineates to what 
extent the ideational aspect of neoliberal-constructivism can be applied in 
regional policy-making; and to what extent the process of Southeast European 
socialisation within Euro-Atlantic structures can be used as an instrument for 
attaining regional stability. For this purpose, the investigation defines the 
concept of order for the Balkans. The suggestion is that Euro-Atlantic 
organisations are equipped to address the Balkan sources of conflict and 
encourage inter-state cooperation. The prospect and conditionality of 
membership provides them with significant influence in the region, which in 
turn facilitates regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of a nascent 
security community. 
 
 
 
“It would be conceited to claim that we have an important role to play. 
Who are we to teach others lessons?” 
Simeon Saxcoburggotsky, Prime Minister of Bulgaria1 
INTRODUCTION 
The major objective of the Euro-Atlantic (i.e. the EU and NATO) accession of the 
Balkans is the establishment of "a peace order" (Mintchev 2001:3) for the region.2 
                                                          
* Marie Curie Visiting Fellow at SPIRIT-Europe, Aalborg University, Denmark. 
1 Interview with Simeon Saxcoburggotsky on 22 March 2002 at: 
http://www.government.bg/PrimeMinister/Interviews/2002-03-22/1485.html 
2 In "the Balkans" I include the following states: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro and Slovenia. For the purposes of the present paper I am 
using the Balkans and Southeastern Europe interchangeably (as synonyms); nevertheless, I am aware 
of the conceptual debate on their different connotations. 
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However, the above statement by the current Bulgarian Prime Minister is 
indicative of a major stasis of meaning in the Balkans, underscoring its 
fragmentation: the belief that Southeast European actors have nothing to offer for 
the stabilisation of the region. This evinces a kind of regional reliance on the 
international community not only to "sort out" the Balkan mess, but also to 
suggest (i.e. dictate) the way for its implementation. That is why the "existence of 
this international high authority... has freed the local parties of ever having to 
agree on anything meaningful" (Sletzinger 2001:7). Thus, it is the lack of regional 
initiative, rather than the oft-quoted "endemic antagonism", that is the main poser 
for the successful accession of the region to Euro-Atlantic structures.  
 
This is especially clear in the post-September 11 environment, when the "Balkan 
fatigue" (particularly in the US) has nearly developed into "abandonment" of the 
region. Such noticeable lack of interest must put the pressure on Balkan actors to 
initiate joint projects for tackling common problems. Thus, the present theorising 
of Southeast European accession to Euratlantic structures aims at depicting a 
desirable optimal end state: the establishment of a security community in the 
Balkans. The purpose of accession is perceived by this exploration not simply as 
individual regional states becoming members of these institutions; but that in the 
process they establish a particular type of order in the Balkans. In this respect, the 
launch of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SP) in 1999, in theory 
suggests the institution of a patterned relationship around the buzzwords of 
socialisation, reciprocity and intersubjectivity.3 However, its praxis (and the fact 
that it took the international community several "Balkan wars" and thousands of 
dead and displaced to formulate the SP) has, so far, failed to materialise this 
expectation. 
 
The current article queries whether it is possible to detect in the theory and praxis 
of international socialisation cooperational frameworks that can be initiated 
without (necessarily) requiring trust or solidarity among the actors; but which (in 
the process of interaction) can lead to establishing trust and solidarity among 
them. Evincing such patterns would help the development of similar frameworks 
for Balkan cooperation that can establish long-term trust and solidarity among 
regional actors. In its essence, this is an attempt to provide a theoretical framework 
of international socialisation that helps initiate a security community-pattern of 
relationship in the region, in its process of Euro-Atlantic accession. Broadly 
defined socialisation involves the transmission of the rules of socially appropriate 
                                                          
3 For an insightful study of the topic see Vucetic (2002). 
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behaviour among actors and in practical terms it provides guidelines to states and 
their leaders about how they are supposed to behave in the international system. 
Consequently, in such an altered and complicated environment as the one in the 
Balkans, the challenge to policy-makers of order formation in the Balkans is both 
pragmatic (how to adjust policy and devise new policy to changing circumstances) 
and substantive (how to adjust pre-existing perceptions and attitudes to accord 
with new realities). 
 
This research focuses on the current debate in International Relations (IR) theory 
on the interaction between "ideas" and "institutions", and their import for the 
international socialisation of the Balkans. However, it delineates to what extent the 
ideational aspect of neoliberal-constructivism can be applied in regional policy-
making; and to what extent the process of Southeast European socialisation within 
Euro-Atlantic structures can be used as an instrument for attaining regional 
stability. For this purpose, the investigation defines the concept of order for the 
Balkans. The objective of its theoretical considerations is to inform regional 
policy-making and decision-taking with the prospects from cooperation and 
community-building in the process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. 
 
The suggestion is that Euro-Atlantic organisations are equipped to address the 
Balkan sources of conflict and encourage inter-state cooperation. The prospect and 
conditionality of membership provides them with significant influence in the 
region. This socialisation occurs in terms of altering domestic practices through 
compliance and learning, and in changing external behaviour. These processes, in 
turn facilitate regional cooperation and thus, the emergence of a nascent security 
community. 
  
WHAT IS ORDER 
The pragmatic purpose for grappling with the issue of international order is to 
provide a definition that suggests a potential for reform in the Balkan region. 
Thus, order is understood to be a framework of predictability. Predictability (in the 
sense of self-sustaining continuity) is rationalised as a mechanism for maintaining 
a structure of power; and power stands for the exchange between different forms 
and sources of authority. In this way, a political order gives meaning to and makes 
sense of the relations and interactions in the international society. That is why, 
order is about control (in the sense of checks and balances): regulating the 
participants' resources, their use and distribution. It sets the framework within 
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which they can be meaningfully utilised and the types of interactions that the 
members can have. 
 
Since the aim of this exploration is not to exhaust the meaning of the concept of 
order, but, instead, to suggest a framework for the discussions of Balkan order, 
this study would like to emphasise three distinct aspects of order: solidarity, 
regulation and security (Rengger 2000). In spite of the fact that more often than 
not these aspects overlap it is the distinct interaction between them that can 
suggest a relationship-pattern for overcoming the current stalemate in the meaning 
of order in the Balkans. The order that this study wants to proffer for Southeastern 
Europe is security community. 
 
The self-sustaining continuity of order derives from the interaction between actors, 
whose behaviour in the international arena is embedded in intersubjective 
understandings and expectations. This intersubjectivity is constituted by the 
collective meanings that actors hold for each other. At the same time, interaction is 
as much the result of a "social contract" (in the sense of a recognition of the 
negative effects the disintegration of this system of exchange can have on the 
actors' own interests and that of the other participants) as well as a consequence of 
the "solidarity" among the participants, deriving from their "shared values" and 
"shared interests" (Wallace 1997:228. Emphasis added). The recognition of the 
interests of the rest points to an awareness of the existence of international 
community. This communitarism stems from a belief that actors have to work 
together for the internationalisation of the democratic community so that they can 
protect themselves from the negative effects of global economic and social forces. 
In other words they embed their roles in the context of belonging to an 
international society (Bull 1979). The understanding of their actions as 
conforming to a pattern of predictability is borne out of the social interaction 
between actors to preserve the structure of order.  
 
Order can be "defined primarily in terms of negotiated connections among 
externally autonomous and internally integrated" actors (March and Olsen 
1998:5). It regulates the relationship between actors' corporate identities and their 
social roles as participants in the international arena. The current international 
order establishes different structures for accommodating the objectives of 
individual actors. In this way, through the regulatory aspect of order, what used to 
be interstate interaction gradually developed into (or more precisely is still 
developing towards) supra-national, non-territorial relations. In this way, order 
identifies actors as separate entities and develops a pattern of predictability 
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through which it mediates their individual goals. At the same time, however, it 
initiates a process of structural change within its participants, in which they 
substitute a portion of their identity in favour of their own (as well as that of the 
system of order) stability. Such identity transformation results from the process of 
social interaction among actors. Changing the context of interaction (i.e. increased 
interdependence and societal convergence) modifies actors' expectations (in the 
context of "character planning"), which, subsequently, affects not only their 
behaviour, but brings about "critical self-reflection... to think of oneself in novel 
terms" (Wendt 1992:419). Thus, their identity is influenced by the relationship-
pattern of predictability, where order allows for re-evaluation of actors' interests 
and identities without endangering the continuity of its stability. 
 
The other important aspect of international order is the establishment of a sense of 
security (among the individual participants). Security is understood as knowledge 
of order's ability to overcome successfully (without disintegration into violence) 
disruptions to its patterns of predictability. Security is a process of continuous 
sanction (in the sense of guarantee) that the system of order protects the 
participating actors from adverse contingencies. In an applied sense, security 
indicates "a low probability of damage to acquired values" (Baldwin 1997:13). 
Therefore, the stability of order indicates its ability “to contain and overcome 
disturbances to order” (Ikenberry 2001:45). This is where the importance of the 
normative culture among actors in the international arena, becomes so important: 
because it constitutes a base that buttresses individual confidence in the 
potentiality of the mutual control over the system's checks and balances.  
 
Such definition of order as interaction between its three aspects (solidarity, 
regulation and security) articulates a distinct pattern of predictability, which 
regulates the intersubjective relationship between actors. The significance of this 
framework of order (i.e. for the discussion of Balkan order) derives from its 
emphasis on international relations as a process of learning and socialisation, 
during which actors develop a cognitive understanding (based on their experience 
of interaction in the international arena) of the reciprocity of international society 
as a security community. This reciprocity (in the context of solidarity) underscores 
the belonging to a community sharing a common normative base. Such 
interdependence mediates actor's interests and regulates their exchange within a 
secure framework of order's stability. Thus, this particular understanding of order 
constitutes a pattern, which allows for peaceful exchange and interest-mediation, 
as well as joint decision-taking and non-territorially-based policy-making. 
IJIS Volume 1
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  NO.1 (2003) 
 
22  
However, prior to dealing with the socialisation dynamic some theoretical matters 
for the understanding and explanation of this process are on order. 
 
DIFFERENT THEORETICAL VIEWS AND ORDER 
Bearing in mind the pragmatic approach to the socialisation dynamic of the 
Balkans – i.e. the purpose of this examination of order is not to exhaust its 
meaning, but rather to position it in a way that would suggest an analytical 
framework for establishing a security-community-type of order in the Balkans in 
the process of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures – this investigation is 
objective to the extent of its awareness of the different theoretical perspectives on 
order, but it is at the same time prescriptive as to its goals. For the purposes of 
clarity this article looks only at the dominant orthodoxies of IR theory: neorealism, 
neoliberalism and constructivism. The focus is on the "kind of knowledge" (Wendt 
1999:377) of international relations that the three analytical frameworks produce, 
and in what way can it be used for theorizing the present state of order in 
Southeastern Europe. Thus, this is an attempt to arrive at a set of useful theoretical 
indicators of a security-community-type of order, which can suggest the necessary 
pragmatic instruments for establishing cooperative relations among Balkan actors. 
This overview suggests the potential for adopting "neoliberal constructivism" as 
the theory underscoring the establishment of a prospective Balkan order. 
 
NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
From a neorealist (Waltz 1979) perspective, the actor of the international system 
of order is the nation-state; while, international politics is the struggle for power –
understood as the ability to influence or resist such influence on the behaviour of 
actors (Buzan et al. 1993). Interstate relations are "always power politics: for it is 
impossible to eliminate power from them" (Carr 1981/ 1939:145). Thus, 
international order is viewed as anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority 
to mediate the relations between states and these states are dependent upon 
themselves (their resources) for the protection of their national interests. Interstate 
interaction is driven by the logic of a "self-help" system, in which collective 
security and closer cooperation are impossible, because of the egotistic, self-
interested and suspicious-of-the-other attitude of each actor. For realists, the only 
means to avoid conflict (war) in such an anarchical system is through the 
development of some sort of hierarchy among states (based on their material 
resources to exert influence). State preferences are usually fixed and conflictual, 
that is why interstate politics become a constant bargaining game (Powell 1999). 
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The pattern of actor-socialisation within a neorealist order is very much 
conditioned by anarchy, rather than the internalisation of ethical norms of 
international relations linked to rights, justice and morality. Actors are led by the 
logic of anarchy, or they are eliminated (Sigel 1970). Thus, compliance is 
achieved only to the extent that an actor is forced to abide by certain rules, 
delineated by the threat from an immanent punishment. For instance, one can take 
the post-Dayton Accords behaviour of Serbia/Montenegro as such example. As 
soon as what was left of the former Yugoslav union perceived that the threat from 
the international community would not be acted upon the Kosovo conflict became: 
(a) a trial of the military capabilities and mostly commitment of the international 
community to deliver on its promises – a test, which as far as Serbia/Montenegro 
is concerned, the Yugoslav army won (Ignatieff 2001:91-219); and (b) it brought 
into question the neorealist concept of non-intervention in intra-state affairs, and to 
a certain extent a case may be made that it violated current international law set up 
to protect state-sovereignty.4 Nevertheless, the Kosovo conflict proved that 
without compulsion an actor would not submit to the signals of the international 
system. 
 
The unfeasibility of providing a viable solution to the problem of Southeast 
European security (in a neorealist international order) comes from the virtual 
impossibility of collective security based on cooperation. The system of anarchy (a 
complex balancing act between states, each desiring to become a hegemon) makes 
collaboration between states almost unattainable. In the realist model, the closest 
nation-states can come to working together is by forming alliances. However, 
alliances (seen as temporary organisations) are formed according to perceived 
hostile intentions of a state (or a group of states) against another (or a group), and 
as such they represent a "balance-of-threat" mechanism as opposed to balance-of-
power (Walt 1987). 
 
As a policy framework, the neorealist view of order is problematic when 
elaborating a prospective relationship-pattern in the Balkans, because of its 
underlying pattern of enmity. On a pragmatic level, it would be very difficult for a 
neorealist framework of analysis to be translated into a practical foreign-policy 
mechanism rooted in a relationship-pattern that would allow actors (not just states) 
to identify positively with one another in the context of a security community. The 
reason being the neorealist assumption that anarchy (the lack of centralised 
                                                          
4 Although as Malcolm (1998:264-5) argues Kosovo was never legally recognized under international 
law as part of Yugoslavia. 
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authority) at the international level (the macro-structure) is interpreted in state 
(highly-centralised) policy-making during international interaction (the micro-
structure) as preserving one's survivability in the natural selection process of the 
neorealist marketplace (Archer 1995). Thus, neorealist theory presents a pattern in 
which actors behave in a way that is dictated by the framework of anarchy of 
international relations (and the perceived malicious intentions among actors), 
rather than from the actual knowledge of the other actors' intent (Wendt 
1999:264). Partly, the reason for the current instability of the Balkans is this "lack 
of interaction" (acting according to assumptions rather than knowledge of the 
other), which hampers the prospect for regional interaction. 
 
NEOLIBERAL PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
The other major tradition in IR is neoliberal institutionalism (Baldwin 1993). For 
neoliberal institutionalists the main actors in the international arena still continue 
to be nation-states; however, they suggest a plethora of non-state actors 
(international and transnational organisations, non-governmental organisation, 
multinational corporations, etc.) as important participants in the process of 
international relations. Institutions in this context are understood to be "a relatively 
stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific 
groups of actors in specific situations" (March and Olsen 1998:8). Neoliberal 
institutionalism presents interstate relations as the complex interdependence of 
distinctive political processes, which translate power's sources into power as 
control of outcomes (Keohane and Nye 1997). The institutions, suggested by 
neoliberal theory, seek "to reduce the uncertainty [of the anarchic system], lower 
transaction costs, and solve collective action problems" (Ikenberry 2001:15). 
 
Both the anticipated and unanticipated consequences of neoliberal institutionalism 
make it a very interesting proposition for outlining a framework of analysis, which 
can support the development of a prospective order for the Balkans. However, the 
post-Cold War years have posed a number of challenges in the Balkans, which 
suggest certain limitations to the logic of neoliberal institutionalism. The benefits 
of socialisation within the rules and procedures of neoliberal institutionalism are 
subjected to the costs of rationalist materialism. Institutionalism alone would not 
introduce an awareness of "common fate", "shared identity" and "we-feeling". It 
can initiate such a process, but there is also the opportunity that it can generate a 
Balkan alliance system of regional divisions and suspicions. In this sense, the 
institutional approach can be effective if it is internalised by all actors involved as 
a mechanism for building trust among them (and not one-way monologue from the 
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EU and NATO towards the Balkans). Thus, the process of enlargement of the EU 
and NATO often tends to be interpreted as a lack of commitment by Euro-Atlantic 
structures to the region, something that brings into question the policies used to 
promote regional stability and security (as for instance the rhetorical hype during 
the launch of the SP and its virtual non-functioning, let alone delivery today). 
Alterations in state behaviour alone within institutional limits (at least in 
Southeastern Europe) are not enough to make the region a place of economic, 
political and social stability, security and cooperation. Achieving this requires a 
thorough investigation into actors' interests and identities: how do they take shape 
and how (if at all) can they be influenced (and changed) in the process of interstate 
interaction. 
 
CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
The end of the Cold War era has posed a number of questions to rationalist 
analysis (both neorealist and neoliberal) of international relations, the majority of 
them querying its focus on the state-centric model. Developments in the former 
Eastern Bloc, and especially in the Balkans, during the 1990s emphasised the 
importance of maintaining peaceful relations through cooperation. However, both 
neorealism and neoliberalism failed to deliver a pattern of cooperative and stable 
relations (in the sense of social, political and economic development) among the 
Southeast European states. Instead the strategy of deterrence, attempted by a 
number of international actors, further exacerbated the situation in the region. 
Partly, the reason for this failure of rationalist approaches, was (1) their inability to 
comprehend the complexity, as well as the diversity of the security dilemmas in 
the Balkans and (2) take into account the individual human input into the 
construction of these dilemmas (and hence their solution). Their models remain to 
a large extent on the state (inter-governmental) level, without considering the 
process of formation of state preferences and interests on the societal level. 
 
The theoretical basis for the study of actors' identities and interests has been called 
constructivism (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999). Constructivism investigates the 
influence of international interaction on actors' interests and identities, and 
challenges the rationalist (both realist and neoliberal) "two-step" (Legro 1996). 
Constructivism proposes that systemic interaction transforms state interests and, in 
the process, even affects their identity (i.e. the logic of anarchy is not fixed). 
Actually, it asserts that the dynamics of international relations are the result of 
actors' need and purposes. Thus, actors' actions (or inactions) are constituted by 
collective meanings. For example "states act differently towards enemies than they 
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do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not" (Wendt 
1992:397). Constructivism also posits that the process of interaction informs the 
meanings in which actors' behavior is organized. The underscoring mechanism in 
interstate relations is learning: interaction reinforces some international processes 
by rewarding actors "for holding certain ideas about each other", and, at the same 
time, discourages them from holding others (Wendt 1992:405). Constructivism 
asserts that actors' identities and interests are formed in the process of interaction 
and are not given prior to it (hence they are not primordial). State identity is 
defined through relations with other states. The process of international relations 
gives meaning to concepts such as "state sovereignty" and "national territoriality". 
 
Constructivism develops the role of identity and interests in international 
interaction. The experience of inter-actor relations develops a repository of 
knowledge about each other, which they use as a basis for their action towards one 
another. However, constructivism alone would not be sufficient to construct a 
theoretical model for a prospective Balkan order. Its idealism (in the sense of 
emphasising how ideas and culture constitute the content and meaning of 
materialist power and interests) provides a rather abstruse theoretical framework 
for influencing decision-making in the region (Wendt 1999:370-7). In order to 
overcome the abstraction of constructivism and also to assist the incorporation of 
its analysis into Balkan policy-making there is a need of rationalist tools to 
instantiate the practices that lead to shared identification among regional actors 
into a security-community-type of order. Owing to the prevalent rationalism of 
Southeast European relations, as well as the dominant position of negative 
identification among the main actors in the region (mainly nation-states, or entities 
aspiring to such status), the only viable approach would be one that would 
combine neoliberal practices with constructivist ideation. 
 
NEOLIBERAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON ORDER 
Neoliberal constructivism (being an eclectic approach) combines in its 
understanding of international order rationalist (interest-based and power-based) 
and cognitive (knowledge-based) perspectives. Applying it to the Balkans involves 
foregrounding the aspects that hold the promise of establishing a stable and 
cooperative pattern of relations. The main aspects of neoliberal-constructivist 
order are: institutions - based on mutual agreements, whose normative "stickiness" 
and institutional autonomy proffer cooperation; and interaction - the process of 
interest and identity formation, which develops experiential knowledge among 
actors and introduces positive identification and community building. Thus, 
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neoliberalism provides the rules and procedures for institutional co-binding, while 
constructivism facilitates the learning of new practices and the establishment of 
trust among actors. Combining these two theoretical concepts of international 
relations allows putting the issue of prospective Balkan order in its rightful 
context: as a distinct pattern based on the interaction between the solidarity, 
regulation and security aspects of order. 
 
Establishing such an order in the Balkans entails the development of institutional 
networks that help develop positive intersubjective meanings among actors. The 
theoretical basis for such pattern can be elicited from the emphasis on the 
weakening position of state actors, followed by the diminishing relevance of 
military security in the context of "complex interdependence". The neoliberal 
notion of "complex interdependence", emphasises that "(1) states are not the only 
significant actors - transnational actors working across state boundaries are also 
major actors; (2) force is not the only significant instrument - economic 
manipulation and the use of international institutions is the dominant instrument; 
(3) security is not the dominant goal - welfare is the dominant goal" (Nye 
1993:169). In this way, institutionalism stresses its pragmatic qualities for 
facilitating the establishment of closer cooperation among Southeast European 
actors. Within the context of the SP, the promotion of economic and social welfare 
is understood as a tool for initiating regional actors into a process of working 
together. This in turn is expected to promote peaceful coexistence (in the sense of 
actor-behaviour that would make the recourse to violence obsolete), which offers 
solution to some of the current problems of Balkan order. Thus, institutions can be 
helpful for creating expectations among actors that they would "behave" in an 
accepted (or agreed upon) way in particular situations. 
 
However, what constructivism contributes to this process is the understanding that 
"complex interdependence" translates into "complex learning" – i.e. the dynamics 
of identity-/interest-formation (Wendt 1999:170). Namely, the process of 
interaction makes actors learn about each other, which provides them with 
knowledge of what to expect from each other. Thus, within the context of 
neoliberal institutionalism they agree to work together, which initially affects only 
their behavior. However, the continual practice (re-enaction of the norms, which 
initiated the process) prompts them to "internalize" the rules and procedures, 
which subsequently affects their identities (how they perceive themselves and the 
other actors) (Wendt 1999:327). In this way actors participate in the pattern of 
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international relations according to the expectations that its rules (instituted 
through "complex interdependence") have been established (and are beneficial).  
 
Within such a framework, neoliberal-constructivism should be understood as a 
"common sense" pattern of international relations (Wendt 1999:296). It is this 
context that allows developing a certain pattern of interdependence, based on 
shared norms and collective identity, which emphasises order as a security 
community. 
 
A security community is an inter-actor relationship that maintains "dependable 
expectations of peaceful change" (Adler and Barnett 1998:30). It represents a 
peaceful, nonviolent international order that elicits the importance of non-national, 
collective identity. In many respects it is the very opposite of realist power 
politics. A security community arises from the process of interaction in which 
actors develop their knowledge of shared meanings and values. The self-sustaining 
continuity of security communities is the result from the institutional self-
enforcing agreement among actors. Neoliberalism offers an opportunity to 
socialise the actors within the norms and rules of the security community. 
Institutions provide the framework for internalising the values beliefs and 
behaviour consistent with their rules, which establish a political culture of 
legitimacy (Wendt 1999:272). In this context, actors' acquisition of the 
institutional rules, helps overcome adversarial polarisations in their relations, 
which subsequently leads to developing stable expectation about each other 
(owing to the internalisation of institutional procedures). Thus, the legitimacy of 
the institutional basis of inter-actor relations within a security community ensures 
"that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will 
settle their disputes in some other way" (Deutsch 1957:5). Thus, the normative 
base of institutions constitutes the regulatory authority of order. It is in this way 
that the establishment of common rules for involving actors in a relationship of 
complex interdependence allows them to begin developing collective interests and 
knowledge of each other. Being always in process, actors' interests and identities 
constantly relearn the benefits from developing positive meanings of each other.  
 
Thus, combining the insights of neoliberalism and constructivism informs the 
study of international orders, and proffers a potential model for theorizing a 
Balkan pattern of international relations. The analytical implications of combining 
institutionalism with interest and identity-interaction suggests a pattern of order 
based on the exchange between different forms and sources of authority, which 
regulate actors' resources (their use and distribution) in the environment of a 
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security community. It provides the basis for promoting institutions for interaction 
between regional actors that can contribute to a process of shared identification. 
The dynamics of common intersubjective meanings has been referred to as 
socialisation. The current process of accession and association with Euro-Atlantic 
structures is expected to put forward a development suggestive of regional 
cooperation in the Balkans. 
 
REGIONAL COOPERATION AND SOCIALISATION 
The defining moment of any international order is its handling of crises. Crisis 
marks the boundary of a security community. It indicates a denial of the “trust and 
shared values among actors” (Bially-Mattern 2001:356). However, the question 
for establishing order in the Balkans is how to initiate a security-community-
relationship among regional actors out of the current crisis (marked by a lack) of 
intra-regional interaction in Southeastern Europe? In the context of the theoretical 
analysis of neoliberal-constructivism the query can be modified as to what type of 
socialisation facilitates the establishment of regional institutions that can introduce 
cooperative exchange in the region? And what is the role of Euro-Atlantic 
structures in assisting (or hindering) such process? 
 
The establishment of a security community in the Balkans can be achieved 
through instituting cooperation among regional actors around issue areas of 
common concern. The expectation is that joint work for tackling such problems 
can help socialise not just the expert-groups directly involved in this exchange, but 
also can contribute to trust-building among societies. Naturally, in its initial stages, 
this could not be the optimal form of a security-community-order. It can be an 
“organisational emulation” of the Euratlantic pattern of institutionalised behaviour 
(Vucetic 2002:113). 
 
The assumption of this research is that the establishment of peaceful order in the 
Balkans is premised on the external promotion of a “nascent security community” 
(Adler and Barnett 1996:36) in the region. Its institution could set the Balkans on 
the course of developing intersubjective relationships that (in the long run) could 
lead to the optimal form of regional security community. However, owing to the 
pragmatics of its promotion, this research would focus primarily on the 
socialization practices that can initiate a nascent security community. Being the 
first stage of a process of regional (re-) building, the nascent security community 
requires material incentives (for instance, conditionality) to sustain its pattern of 
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relationships. Nevertheless, its institutional framework could provide the 
environment for interaction, which could lead to the development of shared 
expectations for appropriate behaviour (i.e. logic of predictability, which can 
facilitate the building of trust).  
 
The expectation is that the current involvement of international structures (i.e. 
Euro-Atlantic institutions) in the Balkans can create the facilitating domestic 
conditions for regional actors (by diffusing “‘selected’ liberal practices”) to initiate 
a security community-type of order (Adler 1997:250). Such relationship can result 
from a redefinition of the acquis process for Balkan actors that would reflect their 
particularism (in the sense of providing assistance, according to specific needs and 
problems), and at the same time stress the importance of the idea and practice of 
cooperation. 
 
Probably the main obstacle for instituting cooperative behaviour in the Balkans is 
the unwillingness of regional actors to identify with each other. The reasons are: 
(1) the current involvement of Euratlantic structures in regional conflict resolution 
focuses on individual actors (i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or Macedonia) 
without involving more regional actors (or the region as a whole) in their 
mediation; and (2) the subsequent pejorative connotation of the region as a symbol 
of instability and division (hence, "Balkanization"). Some regional actors (i.e. 
Croatia) fear regional cooperation, because of its reputed threat to whatever 
stability individual actors have succeeded to maintain. 
 
However, both these points help not only in understanding the need for 
cooperative behaviour in the Balkans, but also for initiating regional cooperation. 
The starting point is the definition of region as an area within which there is a 
more "intensive co-operation" between countries and communities than in their 
interactions with the other parts of the world (Simai 1994: v. Emphasis added). 
The first issue that strikes one is the definition of the Balkans as a region in the 
sense of intensive co-operation. The recent developments in Southeastern Europe 
have indicated just the opposite kind of processes - antagonism and confrontation. 
So, in this sense, is Southeastern Europe a region? According to this definition - 
not! But when one takes into consideration the external perception on Southeast 
European developments, then the answer is - yes! The Balkans is defined not by 
its awareness of itself as an entity, but by the other regions' discernment of the 
area as idiosyncratic. Because of the connotations from Balkan identification, 
regional actors try to disassociate themselves as much as possible from their 
neighbours in an attempt to dispel this view of the Balkans as a peculiar entity. 
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However, these efforts (ironically) further entrench the belief of the outside world, 
that Southeastern Europe is an area with its own, inimitable characteristics of 
antagonism and instability. In this sense, perhaps paradoxically, working together 
can help regional actors disassociate themselves from the negative identification 
of their belonging to the Balkans. That is why, within such context, the 
relationship of the region with the Euratlantic structures needs to satisfy the 
diverse interest of all actors (which can come only from cooperation). This 
understanding beckons an explanation of how socialisation works and what in the 
current process of Euro-Atlantic accession proffers the initiation of a security 
community. 
 
More formally, the international socialisation of Southeastern Europe through the 
accession process is premised on the development of stable institutions of inter- 
and intra-state relations. In itself it is a “process that is directed toward a state’s 
internalisation of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalised in its 
international environment” (Shimmelfennig 2000:111. Emphasis original). In 
other words, it refers to a process through which institutions, practices, and norms 
are transmitted between international actors. Being a complex and context-specific 
process, socialisation (for the purposes of this study) is understood to comprise 
two complementary aspects: compliance (socialisation by international 
organisations) and learning to comply (socialisation in international 
organisations). This indicates that the process of international socialisation has two 
sides: one, potentially coercive and the other – educational. Both of them are 
characterised by their own set of means for achieving adherence to the externally 
promoted rules, however their effectiveness can be assessed in their 
complementarity. 
 
The process of conditionality linked to accession is the main proponent of the 
socialisation by international organisations. In this context, the level of compliance 
is related (i) to expected rewards, and (ii) to avoiding specific punishments (i.e. 
threat of sanctions). The implications for generating cooperative behaviour in the 
Balkans are that enforcement is required to deter states from shirking (Tallberg 
2002:612). The power of attraction of the socialising agencies (the EU and 
NATO) puts them in a strong bargaining position, which allows them to shape the 
procedures and monitor the implementation of rules and norms. For example, the 
“New PHARE Orientations for Pre-Accession Assistance” adopted in 1997 
emphasise that it is the EU (through its Accession Partnerships) and not the 
beneficiaries that decide how PHARE money is spent. Thus, “mandatory 
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adaptation” (Barbara Lippert and Peter Becker quoted in Brusis 2002:534) effects 
adherence to rules by conditioning the actors. Conditionality – “the use of 
incentives to alter a state’s behaviour or policies” (Checkel 2000:1) – emphasises 
the role of the sanctioning authority, which is responsible for monitoring the 
degree of adherence to the promoted norms and rules. In the Balkans (as it has 
already been stated) the principal socialising agencies are the EU and NATO, 
which set up the criteria for accession to their structures. For instance, the 
Copenhagen European Council of 1993 introduced the broad political and 
economic criteria for EU membership, which provided the EU with a mandate to 
monitor, control and guide policy-making in the accession countries. This position 
was re-emphasised in the conclusions of the Luxemburg European Council of 
1997, which suggests the “threshold principle” adopted by the EU, indicating “the 
qualitative and subjective judgements about minimum standards” that applicant 
states must meet in their bid for membership (Jacoby 2001:181). In other words, 
the presence and constant monitoring of this process by the EU offers some 
guarantee that Balkan elites institutionalise and act according to community-
compatible practices. Within this context their compliance with the socialising 
mechanisms is ensured by both the symbolic and instrumental pulling incentives 
of these extra-regional organisations. However, coercive means are required (i) to 
diminish the possibility of free-riding, as well as (ii) to indicate commitment by 
the socialising agency and if necessary make an example of the negative effects of 
non-compliance (as the case of Yugoslavia illustrates). This conclusion 
emphasises the unique position of the Euro-Atlantic institutions (the EU in 
particular) to enforce compliance through the leverage of their supranational 
institutions, and thence (possibly) initiate cooperation in the region. 
 
The socialisation in international organisations occurs through the actual 
interaction by the socialised states with the EU and NATO in partnership and 
association activities. Very often non-compliance occurs not because of a 
deliberate decision of the target to violate the promoted norms and rules, but 
because of the lack of capacity building, rule interpretation and transparency 
(Tallberg 2002:613). Thus, Euro-Atlantic organisations have developed programs 
of learning for accession countries by enhancing the accountability of state 
bureaucracies and providing technical assistance and expertise in the 
implementation of certain programs. For instance, the European Commission 
recognised in 1998 that the “only alternative to long transitional periods is a major 
investment effort” to help applicant countries “adapt to Community norms and 
standards and to develop their infrastructure” (European Report 1998. Emphasis 
added). This conviction is reflected in subsequent initiatives developed by the EU 
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(mainly PHARE and CARDS) aimed at strengthening the programming and 
administrative abilities of candidate countries with the purpose of boosting their 
absorption capacities. One example of the EU fostering domestic institutional 
change is the PHARE “twinning” programme introduced in 1999, in which experts 
from the EU Member States (called “Pre-Accession Advisors”) assist and partner 
their counterparts from accession countries (EC 2001:5). Similarly, NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, introduced at the January 1994 Brussels 
Summit of NATO, is a major initiative to enhance stability and security in the 
applicant countries through capacity building “by promoting the spirit of practical 
cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance” 
(NATO, 2001). In this context, the Balkan accession to Euro-Atlantic structures 
can be viewed as a transnational arrangement to allow time for adapting to 
behavioural requirements (Tallberg 2002:615). In its course, the socialising 
organisation provides authoritative interpretation as well as time for the socialised 
to learn to comply. The power of attraction of extra-regional actors offers the 
stimuli that lead to learning, i.e. policy change (Haas 1990:27-28). Said otherwise, 
the socialisation in international organisations seeks to overcome the ambiguity of 
the promoted norms and build the capacity of the socialised entities to carry out 
their obligations by providing a temporal framework for their implementation 
(Chayes and Chayes 1993:188). 
 
Thus, the power of attraction that the Euro-Atlantic institutions have, allows them 
to become a legitimate authority for evaluating the degree to which its preferred 
norms and rules have become integral part of (i.e. constitutive to) the decision-
making practices of the Balkan states. As it has been outlined in the previous 
chapter, the legitimacy of their involvement derives from the complex discourse 
on accession dynamics, in which “actors regularly refer to the norm to describe 
and comment on their own behavior and that of others, the validity claims of the 
norm are no longer controversial, even if the actual behavior continues violating 
the rules” (Thomas Risse cf. Cortell and Davis 1996:456-57. Emphasis added). 
 
In this way, the two aspects of the international socialisation of the Balkans – 
compliance and learning to comply – are brought together by the Euro-Atlantic 
organisations and promote rule conformity both as a rhetorical practice and 
operational mechanism to justify and facilitate the reproduction of their pattern of 
order. These mutually reinforcing aspects of socialisation develop a common 
process, which develops in three phases: interaction, interpretation and 
internalisation (Koh 1997:2645-649).  
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Interaction occurs in the course of conditioning the target to comply with the 
external agency by convincing it to delegate its sanctioning authority to an 
international institution. This is best evidenced by the influence that Euro-Atlantic 
institutions have in shaping policies in the region through the conditions for 
accession (as well as the prospect of membership). For instance, the 1994 
concluding document from the inaugural conference of the Pact on Stability in 
Europe held in Paris, states that the participants’ “aim is to encourage countries 
which have not yet concluded cooperation and good neighbourliness agreements 
and arrangements, extending also to issues concerning minorities and borders, to 
do so” (EU 1994:100. Emphasis added). Such adoption of superiority powers 
through institutional designs to Euro-Atlantic institutions is a crucial aspect for the 
effectiveness of the socialising interaction (Tallberg 2002:638). It encourages (and 
ensures) respect for appropriate practices and adherence to acceptable patterns of 
behaviour.  
 
Interpretation indicates the mechanisms through which the socialising agency 
translates its requirements to the domestic arena so that it can achieve the 
necessary levels of understanding and, hence, effect compliance. For example, the 
1995 declaration of the Pact on Stability in Europe indicates that the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions “undertake to combine [their] efforts to ensure stability in Europe… 
[by encouraging] states to cooperate across frontiers” (EU 1995:112. Emphasis 
added). This conviction in the teaching capacities is reflected in the words of 
Commission President Jacques Delors, who asserts that the “[European] 
Community has a special responsibility not only because of its importance as a 
pole of stability and prosperity, but also because it has an armoury of instruments 
to deal with the most pressing problems” (Delors 1994:11. Emphasis added). 
 
Internalisation is a matter of practice. It indicates the degree to which the rules and 
norms introduced in the process of interaction and interpreted according to the 
needs of the internal context of the state are actually domesticated in policy-
making. In other words, internalisation “does not require deviant desires or 
behavioural preferences to be completely absent, only that internal (rather than 
external) sanctioning mechanisms are sufficiently effective to prevent deviant 
preferences from becoming norm-violating actions” (Schimmelfennig, 2000:112. 
Emphasis original). However, in the early stages of socialisation, the 
internalisation aspect is induced by the conditions of the socialising agencies. The 
statement of France’s European Affairs Minister, Alain Lamassoure, indicates 
such externally-encouraged internalisation: “No country with unsettled border or 
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minority conflicts will be allowed to join [the EU]” (quoted in The Economist 
1995). 
 
This triple dynamic of socialisation suggests a possibility that can lead not only to 
the transfer of Euro-Atlantic norms and rules to the Balkans, but also the 
replication of their pattern of international relations (i.e. influence foreign-policy-
making in the region). Or as the External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten 
put it at the Western Balkans Democracy Forum, the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements “are extremely demanding because they are not just frameworks for 
dialogue and for good relations… Signatories undertake to align their entire legal 
and economic frameworks with that of the EU. They begin to take on the 
obligations of EU membership, and to put in place a network of cooperation and 
free trade agreements with their immediate neighbours” (Patten 2002:2. Emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus, as Jonas Tallberg asserts, socialisation premised on the complementarity of 
enforcement and teaching tends to be “particularly effective in securing rule 
conformance” and demonstrates “an enhanced capacity to handle non-compliance” 
(Tallberg, 2002:610). Moreover, the Euro-Atlantic institutions have both 
“sufficient credibility and sufficient potency” (George 1999:12. Emphasis original) 
to maintain this process. The promise of membership once the appropriate 
procedures have been domesticated (i.e. internalised) by the acceding states serves 
as a positive incentive that makes regional actors susceptible to international 
socialisation. The presence of the Euratlantic institutions creates favourable 
conditions that make it possible for the actors in the domestic political process (i) 
to internalise international norms and rules, (ii) to appropriate them “to further 
their interests in the domestic political arena” (Cortell and Davis 1996:471), and 
parallel with that (iii) to reproduce it in their international relations. In other 
words, learning becomes a process of “managed interdependence”, where 
Southeast European states are induced to question “older beliefs and… to 
institutionalise new ways of linking knowledge to the task the entity is supposed to 
carry out” (Haas 1990:37). In short, the emulation of the transparent and 
accountable Euro-Atlantic institutions by Balkan elites, makes them more prone to 
cooperation, since the socialising dynamic makes regional bureaucracies less able 
to disguise their capabilities and intentions (Keohane, 1984:258-9). The existence 
of similar democratic domestic institutions can lead Balkan states to consider each 
other as “not-threatening”, and hence, potential partners. Thus, the norms and 
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rules promoted by Euro-Atlantic structures can become the foundations of shared 
meanings that can suggest the initiation of a nascent security community. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The promotion of a secure and stable order in the Balkans must (if not resolve, at 
least) find a way to ensure that all actors involved in the region work together for 
solving common problems. Said otherwise, the establishment of an 
institutionalised setting of Balkan relations can contribute to the introduction of 
stability in the region. Its framework of patterned behaviour involves regional 
actors in a dialogue on common issues and provides them with opportunities to 
exchange information. Thus, this process of exchange based on certain rules and 
procedures can establish shared expectations about each other, which in the 
process of interaction can lead to the establishment of a security community in the 
region. The study of this dynamic entails an examination of the role external actors 
play in the promotion of security-community-relationships in Southeastern 
Europe, as well as the domestic dynamic, which initiates their involvement. 
 
As it has been suggested, in their nascent stage, prospective security communities 
rely (to a large extent) on a complex process of organisational emulation, initiated 
and maintained by third parties. For the Balkans, these extra-regional structures 
are Euro-Atlantic organisations. Their involvement in the region is underlined by 
the policy of promoting a particular intra- (and by implication inter-) state 
relationships aimed at teaching them certain norms and rules of appropriate 
behaviour. In this respect, conditionality (adherence to particular requirements of 
extra-regional actors) has become a pragmatic approach for achieving compliance. 
In other words, the Euro-Atlantic institutions are involved in a process of 
transforming the post-Cold War order in the Balkans to one that is less likely to 
resort to violence for the solution of conflicting issues. Their conflict resolution 
approach can be described as an attempt to socialise Southeast European states 
within a pattern of appropriate behaviour, which can (in the process of accession) 
introduce cooperation (based on shared understandings); and, hence, mitigate the 
instability deriving from the threat of violent conflict. 
 
The argument, then, is that Balkan state-interaction with Euro-Atlantic 
organisations (principally the EU and NATO) leads the latter to propagate norms 
on accepted practices to Southeast European states. These practices relate to 
domestic politics and also to inter-state relations. The rules and norms are 
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propagated in a number of ways. These processes of socialisation, in turn, can 
encourage inter-state cooperation by the Balkan states (i.e. because they have 
adopted similar norms and thus types of practice), which can suggest the 
development of a regional security community. 
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POLITICAL ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS:1 
AN EMERGING TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO 
SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Louise Takeda* 
 
Abstract 
Serious attempts to come to terms with the issues underlying the current 
environmental crisis is calling into question some very basic assumptions 
within the mainstream traditions of economics and development. This article 
explores some of the insights which are arising from a combination of the 
fields of ecological economics and political ecology. The aim in combining 
these two fields is to facilitate an inquiry into the political processes and 
institutions involved in questions of unequal ecological flows and distribution. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“You claim that greater prosperity is the best way to improve the 
environment. On what economy's performance in what millennium do 
you base this conclusion?...To claim that a massive increase in global 
production and consumption will be good for the environment is 
preposterous. The audacity to make such a claim with a straight face 
accounts for much of the heated opposition to the World Trade 
Organisation.” 
    Thilo Bode, Executive Director of Greenpeace2 
 
There is a growing consensus that the conventional model of development, based 
largely on principles from neo-classical economics, is leading humanity down a 
dangerously unsustainable path. While it has certainly produced some marked 
successes, such as rapid economic growth, advanced technological progress, and 
increased levels of consumption, inequality between nations has reached 
                                                 
*Ph.D. Student at the Research Centre on Development and International Relations (DIR), Aalborg 
University, Denmark. 
1This title reflects the combination of the fields of political ecology and ecological economics.  
 
2 Written in a letter to The Economists December 11, 1999, after the formation of the WTO in Seattle. 
Quoted in Martinez-Alier 2002: 16. 
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historically unprecedented levels (UNDP 1998). Statistical evidence has shown 
that poverty, hunger and disease have persisted or got worse in many countries, 
while the basic needs and rights of women, indigenous people and small farmers 
are often not being met or, worse yet, are being threatened by development (Shiva 
1989, Sachs 1993, Sutcliffe 1995). At the same time, more energy and materials 
have been consumed during the last half a century than in the whole preceding 
history of humanity (Altvater 1993). While a few people have attained material 
abundance through industrialisation and economic growth, resource depletion and 
environmental degradation now pose an immediate threat to many, and affect the 
future of us all (Costanza et al. 1997, Rees 1999).  
 
Serious attempts to come to terms with the issues underlying the current 
environmental crisis is calling into question some very basic assumptions within 
the mainstream traditions of economics and development. This article will explore 
some of the insights which are arising from a combination of the fields of 
ecological economics and political ecology. Ecological economics examines the 
physical flows of materials and energy that bind the economy and ecosystems.3 It 
combines an understanding of thermodynamics with complex systems theory and 
systems ecology (Costanza et al. 1997). Political ecology, which originates in 
geography and anthropology, emphasises the structural conflicts between society 
and the environment. As its name suggests, politics and power dynamics are of 
central importance (Bryant 1997). The aim in combining the two is to facilitate an 
inquiry into the political processes and institutions involved in questions of 
unequal ecological flows and distribution. Before moving into the main focus of 
the inquiry, the investigation will begin with a brief look at the mainstream 
approach to solving the environment-development dilemma.  
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
Whereas environmental problems were once commonly believed to be solvable in 
isolation from social issues, the concept of sustainable development introduced a 
new quest for reconciling environmental and social concerns with economic 
growth. The concept of sustainable development was popularised in 1987 by the 
influential Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987). For the first time, a strong link was made between eradicating 
poverty and achieving environmental sustainability. In the report, it was pointed 
                                                 
3It should be noted that the field of ecological economics is conceptually pluralistic. The perspective 
presented here is based on the assumption that ecological studies must be grounded in biophysical 
assessments. 
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out that poor people are often forced to destroy their immediate environment in 
order to survive. This is what Martinez-Alier (1990) refers to as the "too poor to 
be green" perspective. Poverty and pressure of population on resources were 
consequently pointed to as the main problems related to environmental 
degradation. Unfortunately, the report did not go so far as to inquire into the 
political or economic interests which may cause or perpetuate poverty. Nor did it 
include the fact that many environmental conflicts actually involve poor people 
defending the environment and their livelihoods against encroaching economic 
forces (Martinez-Alier 2002). Rather, the view put forward regarded poverty as an 
"original state of being" and, as such, economic growth was turned to as the main 
answer to help the poor out of "their" predicament (Bryant 1997: 6).  
 
At the same time, however, the Brundtland report did acknowledge that much 
economic activity as currently conducted was having negative environmental 
consequences. The problems identified were basically the same as those 
previously named by environmental critiques of development, such as in the 
Limits to Growth report (Meadows 1972). Both reports agreed that economic 
activity was causing pollution, using up scarce resources, disturbing ecosystems 
and destroying habitats. The point of disagreement, however, was what the 
ultimate cause of these problems was. 
 
From the perspective of neo-classical economic theory, environmental problems 
are seen to arise not as a result of economic growth per se, but rather due to the 
fact that many environmental goods are provided for free, and therefore more of 
them is demanded than if they had to paid for (Pearce in Hayward 1995: 90). The 
outcome of this overuse results in external environmental or social costs which are 
imposed on third parties. This is what environmental economists term 
"externalities". The solution, from an environmental economics perspectives, is to 
correct prices by calculating the market value or "shadow price" of these 
environmental costs and benefits, and then bring them back within the market by 
raising prices of damaging activities through taxes, charges, tradable permits and 
so on (Jacobs 1997: 371). Using a single measure of monetary value, costs and 
benefits can then be compared to one another. Then, assuming that prices have 
been correctly calculated, total environmental damage will be reduced to the point 
at which marginal costs equal marginal benefits.  
 
While this argument reveals some important deficiencies in conventional 
economics, some are still not convinced that environmental concerns can be 
sufficiently addressed through the market mechanism. This is particularly the 
opinion among many ecological economists (e.g. Altvater 1993, Røpke 1999, 
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Rees 1998, Martinez-Alier and O'Connor 1996). In addition to critiques 
concerning practical problems with pricing externalities4 or more fundamental 
questions of whether all things can or should be valued in money terms,5 
ecological economists argue from a more scientific nature that mainstream 
economic approaches have failed to understand the physical dimensions of 
ecological problems. 
 
THERMODYNAMICS AND THE ECONOMIC PROCESS  
Up until the recent rise of ecological economics, the sustainability concept has 
been largely restricted to economic criteria. By contrast, ecological economics 
examines the physical aspects of material and energy flows from nature, through 
the economy, and back to nature in degraded form. These material and energy 
flows are essential for all production and consumption, and often determine the 
actual ecological and social impacts resulting from economic activities (Georgescu 
Roegen 1971, Daly 1996, Rees 1999). Yet these vital flows are completely 
invisible to conventional economic analysis. 
 
Ecological economics therefore begins with a conceptual model that sees the 
economy connected to and sustained by a flow of energy, materials and ecosystem 
services. This is in contrast to conventional economics which views the economy 
as an isolated and self-sustaining system which remains largely unconstrained by 
the physical environment (Rees 1999). To help understand the ecological 
economics perspective, an analogy can be made to the biological concept of 
metabolism, whereby all living systems maintain themselves by continuously 
consuming a flow of materials and energy from their environment and discharging 
the corresponding wastes. In the same way, industrial metabolism and human 
social systems maintain themselves by converting raw materials into manufactured 
products and services and discharging the wastes (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 1998). 
                                                 
4 For example, how does one measure the cost of health impairing pollution? If, for example, it is based 
on lost earnings from sickness and death, does it make sense to pollute in countries with the lowest 
wages? How can the cost of things we don't even know about be measured? Consider that it was only 
relatively recently that the importance of the ozone layer was first recognised. How can an 
interdependent ecosystem be divided into individual pieces which can be measured in price? (See Rees 
1999, Røpke 1999, Jacobs 1997, Martinez-Alier 1994, Mayumi and Gowdy 1999 for further 
discussion.). 
5 It has been pointed out that if all things are reduced to their market value, then the activities and 
processes that are not monetised or don't involve cash transactions get undervalued. What is, for 
example, the value of security, beauty, traditions, or community? 
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What then becomes evident from a thermodynamic perspective are the 
unidirectional and irreversible flows which are taking place.  
 
To explain briefly in thermodynamic terms, the First Law of Thermodynamics 
says that matter and energy can neither be created nor destroyed. This means that 
in any physical transformation, the quantity of raw materials and energy taken 
from nature must be equal to the quantity of the waste materials ultimately 
returned to nature. What this means, in terms of economic processes, is that all 
resources extracted from the environment must eventually become unwanted 
wastes and pollutants (Ayres 1998: 190). While recycling helps to reduce waste, it 
also requires fresh inputs of energy, and in the final end still leaves a residue of 
unusable waste. Moving on to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, it says that 
while the quantity of energy will remain constant in an isolated or closed system, 
the energy will tend to dissipate into less useful forms with every physical action 
or transformation (Ayres 1998: 190). In other words, while the quantity of energy 
remains the same before and after a physical transformation, there is a qualitative 
difference in it. This difference is measured in terms of "entropy". Putting the two 
laws together, in any physical transformation, energy and matter are transformed 
from a state of highly concentrated and easily available resources into a state of 
highly dispersed and non-available wastes. What gets used up are "low entropy" 
useful materials, such as fossil fuels or high grade metal ores which are dispersed 
to unusable concentrations over time. What accumulates are other generally 
harmful materials, such as waste products, mine tailings, or thermal pollution 
(Rees 1999: 31).  
 
The problem, in terms of sustainability, is that there are limits on the availability 
of environmental resources and, more significantly, on the absorption capacity of 
the biosphere. In order for an economy to be ecologically sustainable, when it has 
reached the systemic limits of the biosphere, flow rates must be held constant 
(Rees 1999). Signs of stress on the environment, such as loss of top soil, 
contamination of surface waters and oceans, acid rain, the hole in the ozone layer, 
and global warming, strongly suggest that this point has already been reached. If 
this is the case, there must now be a limit on the rate of throughput of energy and 
matter, and therefore a limit on the rate of material production and consumption in 
order to achieve sustainable ecological processes (Altvater 1998: 30-31). From 
this perspective, if the current structure of economic growth is maintained, the 
existing ecological crises can be expected to get worse.6 
                                                 
6 While many environmental economists and industrial ecologists emphasise the potential for 
dematerialising the economy through more eco-efficient production processes, this is not actually 
occurring, despite gains in efficiency. This is because the environmental load of the economy is 
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This thermodynamic critique has serious implications for the conventional model 
of development which relies on economic growth, in both the North and South, as 
the only practical means to alleviate poverty, address material inequalities between 
countries, and provide resources for addressing environmental problems. It also 
brings up the question of distribution between countries in a quite different way 
since, in the face of biophysical limits, the overconsumption of environmental 
resources and services by one party must necessarily be compensated by the 
underconsumption by another party, if the world is to maintain some degree of 
ecological stability (Rees 1999, Sachs 1999). Furthermore, if limited access to 
resources is a cause of poverty, the environmental overconsumption of the rich has 
an enormous effect on the potential for the poor to achieve sustainable 
development. When questions of distribution and access to natural resources and 
services are linked to social structures and questions of power, ecological 
economics enters the field of political ecology (Martinez-Alier 2002).  
 
ECOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION AND UNEQUAL EXCHANGE 
An understanding of biophysical limits reveals the importance of reducing the 
throughput of matter and energy in order to achieve ecological sustainability. 
However, ecological limits are still only half of the story. This becomes clear 
when one considers, for example, the fact that the advanced industrialised 
countries use an enormous amount of non-renewable forms of energy in food 
systems alone, compared with its use for all purposes in poor countries; yet it is 
only a small proportion of the total amount of non-renewable energy used by rich 
countries (Martinez-Alier 1987: 247). The 20/80 "rule of thumb" captures, in a nut 
shell, the huge geographical differences in the use of natural resources and 
services in the world; that is, 20% of the world's population uses 80% of its 
resources (Sachs et al. 1998: x). Moreover, at present, the wealthy 25% of 
humanity living in OECD countries can be seen to require a biologically 
productive space, to produce the resources it consumes and to absorb the 
corresponding wastes it generates, equal to the entire biologically productive 
surface area of the earth (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). This means that whole 
                                                                                                                                                                       
determined not only by production but also by consumption, which is not diminishing on a world scale 
(Martinez-Alier 2002). Moreover, spontaneous efficiency gains in the economy have been shown to 
increase profits or lower prices, both of which lead to increased consumption and accelerated resource 
depletion (Rees 1999: 45).  
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countries survive by appropriating the carrying capacity7 of an area of land vastly 
larger than their own physical territories (Ibid.; Rees 1999). As a way of 
visualising this, Wackernagel and Rees predict that if all people were to live like 
North Americans, three planets would be required to produce the required 
resources, absorb the wastes, and otherwise maintain life-support.8 Such statistics 
give an idea of both ecological limits and North-South inequalities. Furthermore, 
they suggest that economic activity is dependent not only on physical materials 
and energy, but also on social and political organisation in order to acquire and 
transform these resources.  
 
Various critiques are now suggesting that international trade may be providing the 
means by which advanced industrialised nations are able to import sustainability 
from poorer Southern countries (Rees 1992, Satterthwaite 1999, Røpke 1994). 
This is because if environmentally intensive goods can be imported, then the 
importing region may be able to improve its local environmental standards at the 
expense of environmental degradation elsewhere. Muradian and Martinez-Alier 
(2001) point out that this relationship between free trade and the environment is 
one of the main areas of disagreement between environmental economics and 
ecological economics.  
 
One reason for this disagreement can be found in the very different results which 
are obtained depending on whether monetary or physical units are used for 
measuring. Recent studies are showing that while trade between two countries 
may be shown to be balanced in conventional monetary terms, these same trading 
arrangements can be shown to be very unequal in terms of environmental inputs 
and outputs (Giljum 2001, Giljum and Hubacek 2001, Muradian et al. 2001b). By 
thinking in terms of flows of energy and materials rather than national monetary 
trade statistics, the material realities of North-South relations becomes much more 
explicit. For example, if monetary units are used to compare imports and exports, 
the European Union can be shown to have more or less balanced trade relations 
with the rest of the world. However, if physical units of weight are used to 
compare the imports and exports, the EU can be clearly shown to be a large net 
importer of materials and resources (Giljum and Hubacek 2001). Likewise 
                                                 
7 Carrying capacity can be defined as the maximum rate of resource consumption and waste discharge 
that can be sustained indefinitely in a given region by a given population (Wackernagel and Rees 
1996). 
8 This is based on ecological footprint analysis, which measures the amount of biologically productive 
space necessary for a given population to produce the resources it consumes and to absorb the 
corresponding wastes it generates. For a more in depth discussion of the method, see "Forum: The 
Ecological Footprint" in Ecological Economics 32(2000)3. 
IJIS Volume 1
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  NO.1 (2003) 
 
48 
considering the production of pollution-intensive products, if monetary units are 
used, the EU can be shown to be a net exporter of pollution-intensive products in 
some years. However, if physical units are used, the EU always appears as a large 
net importer of these products (Muradian and Martinez-Alier 2001).  
 
Seen from the perspective of conventional trade theory, this all makes some sense. 
Going back to conventional trade theory for a moment, a cornerstone of it is the 
"law" of comparative advantage, which states that a country will have a 
comparative advantage as long as the commodity which it "produces" requires 
locally abundant factors and few scarce factors (Muradian and Martinez-Alier 
2001). At the core of the theory is the role of specialisation. Typically, the 
advanced industrialised countries of the North specialise in producing goods for 
internal consumption and export, while the less industrially developed countries, 
particularly in Africa and Latin America, specialise in particular extractive 
exports, and depend on importation of transformed commodities for their own 
consumption. According to the theory, as long as each country is trading what it 
can produce at a relatively lower cost to other things, then both sides of the trading 
arrangement will benefit. The problem however is that not all comparative 
advantages are equal. 
 
A new theory of ecologically unequal exchange is now emerging which questions 
the gains from trade for exporters of natural resources. As such, it challenges the 
wisdom of the export-led development model, which is currently actively 
promoted by international institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. By examining the net flows of energy and materials, new aspects 
regarding the differential costs and benefits to extractive and productive regions 
can be shown (Bunker 1985).  
 
Previous arguments put forward in theories of imperialism, dependency, and 
unequal exchange based on wage or productivity differentials have all recognised 
primary material export as a defining characteristic of most forms of under 
development (Emmanuel 1972, Amin 1977). The approach of ecologically 
unequal exchange, however, extends these theories by taking into consideration 
the large environmental impact of the specialisation in the exports of natural 
resources (Sustainable Europe Research Institute 2001, Bunker 1985). 
Ecologically unequal exchange can be seen to stem from two sources: 1) the fact 
that local resources are sold cheaply or given away or health damaging substances 
are tolerated, not because of a lack of awareness but because of a lack of economic 
and social power in the exporting region; and 2) the fact that primary commodities 
produced for export from the South frequently take a much longer time to 
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regenerate than the rapidly manufactured products or services which they are 
traded for in the North (Martinez-Alier 2002: 214). The concept of ecologically 
unequal exchange is summed up well in the following:  
 
By ecologically unequal exchange we mean the fact of exporting 
products from poor regions and countries, at prices which do not take 
into account the local externalities caused by these exports or the 
exhaustion of natural resources, in exchange for goods and services from 
richer regions. The concept focuses on the poverty and the lack of 
political power of the exporting region, to emphasise the idea of lack of 
alternative options, in terms of exporting other renewable goods with 
lower local impacts, or in terms of internalising the externalities in the 
prices of exports, or in terms of applying the precautionary principle to 
new export items produces with untested technologies. 
( Ibid.: 214) 
 
Seen from this perspective, the exploitation of resources and ecosystems, together 
with the exploitation of labour and unequal distribution of monetary wealth, must 
be considered as important factors affecting the potential for long-term regional 
development.  
 
INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF EXTRACTION AND PRODUCTION 
In one of the earliest studies of ecologically unequal exchange, Bunker (1985) 
emphasised the internal dynamics of extractive and productive social formations in 
order to demonstrate how extractive economies become impoverished through the 
export of their resources; while productive economies, which appropriate these 
resources for their industrial processes, develop economically and increase their 
power to ensure the continued flow of resources to them.9 Part of his explanation 
focussed on the effect of space (Bunker 1985: 22-27). Bunker pointed out how 
productive enterprises are able to locate close to one another to benefit from 
shared infrastructure and labour forces. In this way, even when one enterprise 
collapses, the infrastructure remains for subsequent enterprises. In contrast, 
extractive processes must locate near the natural resource which they exploit, often 
far from other enterprises and existing demographic or economic centres. 
Therefore, they often require the development of new infrastructure for resource 
removal and transport, labour recruitment, shelter and so on. However, once the 
resource is depleted or no longer in demand, the infrastructure and labour force 
                                                 
9 This study focussed on the history of the Brazilian Amazon Basin over 350 years. 
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established at these sites are no longer of any use. Consequently, social 
development in extractive regions tends to be discontinuous in time and space.  
 
Another part of his explanation focussed on the dynamics of scale. Bunker pointed 
out how, in industrial systems, the unit cost of commodity production decreases as 
the scale of production increases ( Ibid. 25). In this way, productive processes 
benefit from labour saving technology and the use of fossil fuels. In extractive 
economies, however, the more resource which is extracted, the more difficult and 
expensive it becomes to extract remaining supplies. Therefore unit cost tends to 
rise as the scale of extraction increases, and the amount of resource available for 
further extraction decreases. Eventually the increasing cost of extraction gives new 
locations or industrial substitutes a competitive advantage, seriously reducing or 
eliminating the original extractive enterprise.  
 
Bunker also pointed out that extractive processes frequently entail a much lower 
ratio of both labour and capital to value than do productive processes ( Ibid. 23). 
This means that the majority of value in an extractive economy is in the resource 
itself, and profit occurs in the exchange itself rather than in the sector. Therefore, 
while extractive processes may initially produce rapid rises in regional incomes, 
this may be followed by equally rapid collapses when the depletion of easily 
accessible resources requires additional inputs of labour and capital without 
corresponding increases in volume.  
 
From this perspective, it becomes apparent how resources, which may take 
thousands of years to regenerate (if at all), are extracted and exported with little or 
none of the extracted materials or energy flowing through the extractive economy 
to be conserved in durable infrastructure, or embodied in complex social 
organisation.10 In productive economies, on the other hand, imported materials and 
energy flow through the economy and create an accelerated energy flow which 
permits the development of specialised technical and social organisation, and 
allows for more powerful means of exploiting the energy in the environment. 
Bunker concludes that the hierarchies of power and control, associated with these 
developments, can be seen to have culminated in the present global market system.  
 
                                                 
10This is based on the understanding that matter both stores energy and can be converted to energy. 
While the conservation of energy and matter into more durable forms is most perceivable as physical 
infrastructure, at a more abstract level, it may also take the form of learning, complex social 
organisation, and technology (Bunker 1985: 45). Bunker points out that, while energy and matter 
cannot in themselves cause these development, they are a necessary prerequisite since none of these 
development can occur without the conversion of energy and matter ( Ibid. 245) 
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MARKET INSTITUTION AND THE TRANSFER OF WEALTH  
The theory of ecologically unequal exchange can go one step further and ask why 
market prices and the market mechanism have not provided a fair and reciprocal 
exchange. From the perspective of standard economic theory, the problem is seen 
to lie in the existence of incomplete markets, and the need for establishing 
property rights (Martinez-Alier 2002). Bunker and other "political ecological 
economists", however, emphasise the issue of power. It seems quite evident that 
those suffering unfavourable rates of exchange are likely to have less power, and 
that such unfavourable rates of exchange will, in turn, tend to enhance power 
differentials over time (Bunker 1985: 247).  
 
An interesting approach taken by Hornborg (1998) focuses on how the market 
institution organises the net transfer of energy and materials to world system 
centres. He points out that, in order for industrial centres to appropriate the goods 
and services they require from other regions, it is helpful if such flows are 
represented as reciprocal exchange (Yoffee, Godelier in Hornborg 1998: 134). 
One way that this gets represented as reciprocal exchange is through the notion of 
market prices. Hornborg points out that since industrial processes necessarily 
entail a degradation of energy, then the sum of products exported from an 
industrial centre must contain less energy than the sum of its imports. However, in 
order to stay in business, the finished products will need to be sold for more 
money than the amount spent on the fuels and raw materials used in their 
manufacturing. His research reveals that for any given set of fuels and raw 
materials to be used in manufacturing a particular product, the more that its 
original energy is dissipated, the higher the finished product will be priced. What 
this means, in short, is the more resources that flow through an economy, the more 
money that can be made, and the more new resources that can be purchased.  
 
Once again, this situation makes sense from a standard economic perspective. It is 
exactly this logic that allows for an expanding cycle of production and keeps 
industrial production profitable and competitive. However, as Hornborg points 
out, this logic has also provided industrial sectors the means by which to 
appropriate accelerating quantities of energy (Ibid. 133). This accelerating 
appropriation of resources from other countries has not only deprived certain 
countries from developing sustainably, but it has also led to massive ecological 
damage. 
 
Such understandings point to the socially contextual nature of neo-classical 
economics, and emphasise the fact that sustainability is much more than a 
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technical issue. As Norgaard (1994: 222) comments, "It is not an accident that 
neo-classical economics addresses the piecemeal correction of resource and 
inefficiencies through improved markets, largely ignoring the historical role of 
markets within a broader vision of viable relations between economics and the 
environment". This is an important point since how systems are understood 
historically affects not only our actions within those systems but also efforts to re-
design them (Toulmin in  Ibid. 222). 
 
A NEW LOOK AT "WHO OWES WHOM" 
Contrary to the conventional view that environmental degradation in the South is 
caused by people "too poor to be green", the perspective of ecologically unequal 
exchange emphasises the way in which resources are appropriated by world 
industrial centres at prices which do not reflect the many environmental 
externalities of export production nor their social impacts. In contrast to the 
fundamental assumption of free trade, which claims that prices in the international 
trading system always reflect the full costs of production, studies of ecologically 
unequal exchange show that unrecognised and uncompensated externalities are an 
inherent part of the world trading system. When countries export commodities at 
prices which do not take into account the negative local externalities caused by the 
extraction of resources or the production of pollution-intensive products, then 
costs get shifted from the importing region to the exporting region (Sustainable 
Europe Research Institute 2001, Muradian et al. 2001a).  
 
There is now increasing reference to the "ecological debt" which the advanced 
industrialised countries have to the developing South. Ecologically unequal 
exchange is one source of this debt, and its beginnings can be traced back to the 
stripping of resources and loss of life associated with centuries of colonisation. 
However, this ecological debt continues to accelerate today, with increased 
pressure for exports from structural adjustment programs, intellectual 
appropriation of ancestral knowledge, or degradation of the best soils for cash 
crops. 
 
There is also another, more commonly referred to source of the ecological debt, 
and that is the historic and current levels of carbon dioxide emissions. This stems 
from the fact that the advanced industrialised countries produce around three 
quarters of the total world carbon emissions, but correspond to only one quarter of 
the world's population (Martinez-Alier 2002: 231). Based on equal emissions per 
person, the International Panel on Climate Change calculated that the rich 
countries use around 3 billion tons of carbon more per person per year than what 
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would otherwise be their fair share ( Ibid. 231). The ecological debt can then be 
calculated according to how much it would cost to reduce these excessive 
emissions. With an approximate cost of reducing carbon emissions at US $20 per 
ton, the carbon debt of the advanced industrialised countries can be calculated to 
be around US $60 billion per year ( Ibid. 231).  
 
This puts a new twist on the question of "who owes whom" in the world, since the 
accumulated Latin American external debt in 1999 of US $700 billion is 
equivalent to only 12 years of carbon debt (Ibid. 231). From this perspective, not 
only does the ecological debt make evident the multiple inequalities in the present 
world market system, it also makes the external debt of third world countries 
appear illegitimate.11 It also puts clear responsibility on the North to reduce 
emissions proportional to their current ecological debt, and to assist other 
countries in dealing with the effect of climate change who are not responsible 
historically for its causes. Likewise, it puts a certain obligation on those who have 
benefited from ecologically unequal exchange to restore or compensate areas in 
the South which have suffered from the extraction of natural resources and export 
of monocultures. Furthermore, with the external debt being used as political 
pressure for the over-exploitation of natural resources, it can be concluded that in 
order to effectively deal with the current ecological crisis, both the external debt 
and the ecological debt need to be redressed.  
 
Recognition of the ecological debt could, therefore, have far ranging political and 
economic consequences. However, making progress on this issue obviously 
requires a great deal of concerted effort from people, organisations, and 
governments in the South, as well as people and organisations acting in solidarity 
in the North. At present, there are several international campaigns which are 
applying the concept of ecological debt towards progressive ends.12 The point, 
however, is that as long as economic theory only investigates connections between 
countries in terms of monetary relations, the existing ecological asymmetries will 
                                                 
11 With regards to this point, it is of significance to mention the recent ruling in Argentina on the 
foreign debt, which established the responsibility of civil servants of the dictatorship that contracted it 
and co-responsibility of international organisations like the IMF, who approved illegal and fraudulent 
loans. This legal approach may be the most effective means of establishing the ultimate illegitimacy of 
foreign debts in many third world countries (Gaona 2001). 
12 See for example "Ecological debt campaign" (http://www.cosmovisiones.com); the Dakar 
declaration for the total and unconditional cancellation of African and third world debt" 
(http://www.anotherworldispossible.com/socialforumA_history_dakar.html); or the International 
Institute for Environment and Development's "World Summit on Sustainable Development" news 
letter. 
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remain largely invisible. Therefore, increasing awareness and continuing pressure 
is necessary to make these ecological arguments into conscious and more widely 
acknowledged political issues.  
 
CONCLUSION 
A political ecological economics approach directly challenges some basic 
assumptions within conventional theories of economics and development. A 
thermodynamic understanding of production and consumption challenges the 
mainstream orthodoxy of economic growth by pointing to the physical limits of all 
growth, and more profoundly to the entropic nature of all economic activity. With 
environmental systems already showing signs of stress, attempts to maintain the 
existing structure of economic growth can only be expected to deepen the current 
ecological crisis. As Altvater (1993) argues, ecological limits eventually turn into 
social limits and finally into barriers to the dominant economic rationality. 
 
By considering the net flows of energy and materials between extractive and 
productive social formations, it becomes evident how specialisation in the export 
of abundant raw materials and primary commodities in the South, as 
recommended by the theory of comparative advantage, can lead to short-term 
“illusory” growth, but that such development tends to be unsustainable in the long-
term. In addition, the theory of ecologically unequal exchange helps explain how 
Northern advanced industrial countries are able to maintain a high level of 
production and consumption, while improving their local environmental standards, 
by shifting environmental costs to the South. From this perspective, reliance on the 
extraction of primary goods as a basis for development can be concluded to be not 
only economically unsound, but also socially, politically and ecologically 
detrimental. 
 
The understandings expressed through the theory of ecologically unequal 
exchange and ecological debt provide fresh insights into the causes of uneven 
development and new perspectives towards what needs to be done to resolve this 
imbalance. By focussing on aspects which have largely been neglected in 
development debates, an approach drawing on ecological economics has the 
potential to side-step hardening conflicts and access new points of entry into 
discussions on free trade, economic specialisation and (un)sustainable 
development. Furthermore, its more accurate and complete understanding of the 
interaction between human and environmental systems is essential in order to 
develop appropriate strategies and innovations for achieving both ecological 
sustainability and a more equitable distribution of resources and wealth. 
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THE TRIUMPH OF AN ISLAMIC PARTY IN TURKEY: 
EFFECTS OF THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS ON THE RISE OF 
THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP) 
 
Bezen Coskun* 
 
Abstract 
The triumph of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has an 
absolute majority in Turkish Parliament, is not a sudden incidence. It is 
worth exploring the roots of this triumph within the democratisation process 
of the country. During the Turkish democratisation process, several 
breakdowns and restorations have occurred and military regimes have 
attempted to change the Turkish party and election system in accordance 
with their expectations. However, many of these interventions, which were 
imposed by the military regimes, have had positive affects on the recent rise 
of the Justice and Development Party.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has promoted the 
establishment and maintenance of formal democratic systems. Therefore, 
Western democratic countries have insisted on supporting so called second and 
third wave democratic countries, which have tried to establish or maintain 
democratic regimes. 
 
By the late twentieth century, many more transitions from non democratic to 
democratic regimes have occurred. In this context, Samuel Huntington defines 
three waves of democratisation: the first wave had its roots in the American and 
French revolutions; the second wave is a short wave, which started in the 
Second World War; and finally the starting point of the third wave is the end of 
the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974, which has led to transitions to democratic 
regimes in approximately thirty countries (Huntington, 1991:15-21). In spite of 
their transition efforts, in some second wave countries and in many third wave 
countries the democratisation process has been problematic. Turkey is one of 
these countries, which still has problems consolidating its democracy. 
  
                                                 
* Current master's student at the Research Centre on Development and International Relations 
(DIR), Aalborg University, Denmark. 
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Although Huntington classifies Turkey as one of the second wave democracies, 
it is not still accepted as a liberal democratic country by academic and political 
circles. Diamond and Myers (2001:3) classify Turkey as a non-liberal electoral 
democracy. 
  
According to Ozbudun (2000:1), “Turkey is an interesting test case for many 
recent theories on democratisation.” This is mainly because Turkish 
democracy has experienced several democratic breakdowns and restorations 
because of military interventions, and Turkey is still far from having reached 
the level of a consolidated democracy. At the same time there are anti-
democratic cases which have occurred in Turkey, for example some political 
parties have been closed and some party leaders have been banned. Moreover, 
Turkey is the only democratic and secular country in the Islamic world. 
Especially after the last election which resulted in the triumph of an Islamic 
party, the question of compatibility of Islam and democracy has been another 
reason for why Turkey is an interesting case for democratisation theories.  
 
Following Turkey’s general election on  November 3, 2002, for the first time in 
fifteen years one party has an absolute majority. Despite hindrances - the leader 
of the Party, Tayyib Erdogan, was banned from participating in elections - the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) won an overall majority within the 
Turkish Parliament. Since the most debatable characteristic of the leading party 
(AKP) is its Islamic roots, the sort of thing that the secularist armed forces 
would not normally tolerate, the major question for academic and political 
circles is: “Can Islam and democracy live together without military 
intervention?” 
 
As a result of the fragility of the new political situation in Turkey, within the 
context of the democratisation process, it is worth examining how the 
democratisation process in Turkey, with its party system and electoral 
behaviour, has affected the recent rise of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP). 
 
This article will attempt to explain the effects of the democratisation process on 
the rise of Islamic parties. In this context, conjuncture of the party system and 
electoral behaviour will be analysed as major angles of the Turkish democracy.  
 
In order to explore the effects of the Turkish democratisation process on the rise 
of the AKP, Joseph Schumpeter’s and David Held’s well-known definitions of 
democracy will be presented. In addition to these definitions, a “western model 
of liberal democracy” will be discussed and compared with a “non-liberal 
electoral democracy model”. Moreover, the phases of the democratisation 
IJIS Volume 1
B. COSKUN – THE TRIUMPH OF AN ISLAMIC PARTY IN TURKEY 
 
61 
process and characteristics of the consolidation period will be briefly touched 
upon. In the second section of the article the Turkish case of democratisation 
will be explored and analysed. 
 
DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION  
Virtually, every country may define itself to be a democracy. On the one hand, 
most military regimes which seize power without legitimacy claim that they 
came to power in order to restore a democratic regime.  On the other hand many 
non-democratic governments create some strange formulations for their regimes 
such as “guided democracy”, “people’s democracy”, or the “people’s 
democratic dictatorship” as the Chinese People’s Republic officially terms itself 
in the Preamble to its constitution (Parry & Moran 1994:2). If every 
government can define its own democracy with different aspects, how can 
democracy be defined? 
 
In general, democracy might be defined as a form of government in which the 
people rule. In spite of the existence of this simple definition, the concrete way 
in which the government should be organised and the question of which 
conditions and preconditions it requires have been debated for several centuries 
(Sørensen 1998:3).  
 
One of the widely accepted definitions of democracy has been formulated by 
Joseph Schumpeter. He defines democracy as a mechanism for choosing 
political leadership:  
 
“The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving 
at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.  
(Schumpeter cf. Sørensen, 1998:10) 
 
In contrast to Schumpeter’s narrow definition, David Held’s definition of 
democracy is very comprehensive, and mainly focuses on democratic 
autonomy. According to Held, democratic autonomy requires both a high 
degree of accountability of the state and a democratic existence of civil society:  
 
“Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the 
conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights 
(and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the 
framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to 
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them, so long as they don’t deploy this framework to negate the rights 
of others.”  
(Held cf. Sørensen 1998:10) 
 
Schumpeter’s and Held’s definitions are two different sides of the debate about 
what democracy is and what it ought to be. As democracy is a dynamic entity, 
this leads to emphasising different aspects of democracy in framing different 
understandings of the concept (Sørensen 1998:10).  
 
In practise, for new democratising countries, the “western model of liberal 
democracy” has been accepted as a reference point of view for their 
democratisation processes. Liberal democracy might seem a safe alternative for 
those countries since it has been tried and tested by the Western world. In 
addition to this, within the context of international political economy, 
institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and the committee of the G7 
countries have a tendency towards encouraging conformity to liberal 
democratic practises with the economic policies of these countries (Parry & 
Moran 1994:7).  
 
Since the Western model of liberal democracy has been overwhelmingly 
accepted as a reference point, for democratising countries, the democratisation 
level of countries is evaluated within the definition of liberal democracy. As a 
result, it is necessary to define the characteristics of liberal democracy and its 
differences with other regime forms. In this context, four types of regimes are 
defined by Diamond and Myers: liberal democratic regimes, non-liberal 
electoral democratic regimes, pseudo democratic regimes and authoritarian 
regimes. For our purpose, only liberal democratic regimes and non-liberal 
electoral democratic regimes will be explained here.  
 
Non-liberal electoral democratic regimes exemplify the narrow conception of 
Schumpeter. In non-liberal electoral democratic regimes, the legislative and 
chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty 
elections with universal suffrage. In some of these non-liberal electoral 
democratic countries, the rule of free and fair election is followed. In these 
cases, in spite of democratic elections, the political system suffers some 
democratic defects. For instance, extensive violations of human rights, 
suppression of minority group rights, abuses of state power, hidden domination 
by the military or other centres of power, and serious constraints on the ability 
of various interests to organise. Today, more than 30 states hold regular, 
competitive and relatively free, fair and meaningful elections but their citizens 
have considerably less freedom than in liberal democracies. On the other hand, 
in addition to the elements of electoral democracies, liberal democracy 
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constrains executive power and upholds constitutional rule with extensive 
individual and group freedoms and a strong rule of law (Diamond & Myers 
2001:2-3). 
 
Transition to democracy is a complex process, which involves several phases 
(see Figure 1). In a typical case, the beginning of the process is marked by 
crises within the non-democratic regime. But generally, the new regime which 
comes after the breakdown of the former non-democratic regime will often be a 
restricted democracy. Therefore, several phases of “democratic deepening” may 
be necessary for consolidation of the democratic regime (Sørensen 1998:39). 
 
FIGURE 1. TRANSITIONS TOWARD DEMOCRACY: A MODEL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Georg Sørensen (1998, 40) 
 
Consolidation of the democracy is the most problematic phase in the 
democratisation process. During the consolidation process, crises and 
breakdowns may occur. The typical pattern for new democratising countries has 
been a see-sawing between authoritarianism and frail democracy. The full 
process of consolidated democracy may take several decades. For instance, in 
Great Britain the full process took more than two hundred years (Ibid.:39). If 
Great Britain, USA and France are accepted as examples of consolidated 
democracy, how can “full consolidated democracy” be defined? According to 
Juan Linz, consolidated democracy is: 
 
“one in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized 
interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative 
to democratic processes to gain power, and that no political 
institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically 
elected decision makers. This does not mean that there are no 
minorities ready to challenge and question the legitimacy of the 
Background 
Condition: 
 
National Unity 
1. Preparatory 
Phase: 
  
Breakdown of 
the non 
democratic 
regime 
2. Decision Phase:
 
Beginning 
establishment of 
democratic order 
3. Consolidation Phase:
 
Further development of 
democracy; democracy 
ingrained in the political 
culture 
IJIS Volume 1
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  NO.1 (2003) 
 
64 
democratic process by non-democratic means. It means, however, that 
the major actors do not turn to them and they remain politically 
isolated. To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the “only game 
in town.”  
(Juan Linz cf. Sørensen 1998:44) 
 
Consolidation is not a purely political process but also demands some economic 
and social changes, and at the final phase of consolidation, democratic 
institutions and practices become an indispensable part of the political culture. 
Not only political leaders but also the majority of political actors and the 
majority of the population should see democratic practises as part of their social 
life (Sørensen 1998:44-45). 
  
In conclusion, the democratisation process is not an easy and linear process. 
There is no historical law which defines the transition process, since, all 
countries have their own unique characteristics. As mentioned before, the 
common case in many democratising countries seems to be a see-saw between 
authoritarianism and frail democracy. Today there are few countries, which can 
be considered as consolidated democracies. Many of the second wave and third 
wave countries including Turkey have serious problems in consolidating their 
democratic regimes.  
 
THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN TURKEY 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEMOCRATISATION IN TURKEY 
The first parliament in Turkish history was founded in 1876 during an imperial 
period. This was a short experience. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led the way to establishing a constitutional 
parliamentary system in 1923. With respect to universal suffrage, Turkey has 
had a better record compared with many contemporary consolidated 
democracies. For instance, Turkish women were granted the right to vote in 
1930 and only four years later they had the right to stand for elections; while 
French women had to wait for ten, Greek women eighteen and Canadian 
women twenty-six more years to have their unrestricted political rights (Esmer 
2002:1). 
 
The first multi-party election was held in 1946. It was not absolutely free and 
fair, and, four years later, the government changed democratically through 
popular election. In this election, the opposition party (Democrat Party - DP) 
won 83.6% majority. For observers of Turkish politics, this was an unexpected 
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outcome, which also exceeded the hopes of the Democrat Party itself. The DP 
governed Turkey for more than ten years and its rule ended with a military 
intervention on May 27, 1960. This was the first breakdown of democracy. In 
this period electoral politics were revised with a new constitution, and an 
election law based on proportional representation was introduced. Since the 
introduction of proportional representation, coalition governments have been 
the rule and one-party governments have rarely been realised (Esmer 2002:1).  
 
There were three transition periods from military rule in Turkey: 1960-1961, 
1971-1973, and 1980-1983. These three periods corresponded to three military 
interruptions of the democratic process (Ozbudun 2000:24). During the 1980s’ 
military rule, a 10% national threshold system was introduced in order to 
eliminate the more ideological minor parties and to transform the system into a 
more manageable two or three party system (Ibid.:75-76).  
 
As a result of these military interventions,  
 
“despite a history of fourteen multiparty elections, parliamentary rule, 
and most important, a peaceful change of governments through 
elections a number of times, Turkey has had a difficult time being 
accepted as a democracy by international academic and political 
circles ”  
(Esmer 2002:2) 
 
PARTY SYSTEM AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN TURKEY 
Commenting on Turkish politics in the 1950s, Frederick Frey argued that: 
 
 “Turkish politics are party politics…Within the power structure of 
Turkish society, the political party is the main unofficial link between 
the government and the larger, extra governmental groups of 
people…”  
(Frederick Frey cf. Ozbudun 2000:73)  
 
However after the 1950s, the Turkish party system has changed dramatically. 
Since the 1950s, the pattern of Turkish party politics has passed through most 
types of party systems, which is defined by Giovanni Sartori as: predominant 
party, two partism, moderate multi partism and atomised multi partism (Sartori 
1976:283). According to Sabri Sayari, the Turkish party system:  
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“…changed from bi-partism (1950-1960) to moderate multi-partism 
(1961-1980) to moderate multi-partism with a dominant party (1983-
1991) and to extreme multi-partism with no dominant party (1991-
[2002])”  
(Sayari cf. Esmer 2002:4)  
 
Especially after the 1970s, parties and the party system have been decaying 
with growing fragmentation, ideological polarisation and declining public 
support and identification with individual parties (Ozbudun 2000:73). During 
this period, the two parties’ dominance has eroded and centrist parties have 
been weakened. In their place, extremist Islamic and extremist right wing 
parties have risen as a major force in electoral and parliamentary politics 
(Sayari 2002:9). 
 
In 1990, two-party rule was replaced by a coalition of minority governments. It 
was a system based on a highly fractionalised parliament in which there were 
three-to-five relatively equal parties. Governments could only be formed 
through coalition arrangements (Ibid.:10). The major characteristic of the 
parliaments between 1990 and 2002 was a high level of fragmentation. The 
proportion of votes going to the largest parties declined, along with their 
number of seats in the parliament, as shown in Table 1 (Tachau 2002:42). As a 
result, these fragmented coalition governments were unable to produce effective 
economic and social policies, and dissatisfaction among voters increased. This 
period, which is characterised by highly fragmented coalition governments, 
ended with the last general election, held on November 3, 2002.  
 
Table 1. Party Fragmentation, 1961 - 1999  
Year Percentage of Vote 
Won by Two Strongest 
Party 
Percentage of Seats 
Won by Two 
Strongest Party 
Number of 
Parties 
Winning 
Seats 
1961 71.5 73.5 4 
1965 81.5 83.1 6 
1969 74.0 88.6 8 
1973 63.1 74.2 7 
1977 78.3 89.3 6 
1983 75.6 82.2 3 
1987 61.0 87.9 3 
1991 51.1 65.1 5 
1995 41.1 53.2 5 
1999 40.0 47.2 5 
Source: Tachau (2002:42) 
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One of the general characteristics of the Turkish party system which leads to 
the formation of highly fractionalised parliaments is volatility, that is, sudden 
and significant changes in party votes from one election to the next (Ozbudun 
2000:74). Nearly one-fifth of the electorate transferred their votes from one 
party to another in the elections during the decade following the 1960 military 
intervention. Besides the volatility the Turkish electorate has tended to divide 
its votes among a number of parties (Carkoglu and Avci 2002:115). Rising 
volatility and the lack of stable partisan support has hindered the stabilisation of 
the party system (Sayari 2002:10). Ali Carkoglu estimates that average 
volatility for the 1954-1995 period was 21.1% (Ali Carkoglu cf. Sayari 
2002:22). In comparison with the established democracies of Western Europe, 
party loyalty is lower in Turkey. On the other hand:  
 
“when examining electoral volatility through aggregate data, it is 
important to note that the support given to party families on the right 
and the left has not changed significantly over the years. Centre-right 
and far-right parties have consistently received about two-thirds of the 
total votes in the eight parliamentary elections between 1961 and 
1999. During the same period, approximately one-third of the Turkish 
voters have supported the centre-left and extreme-left parties.”  
(Sayari 2002:23)  
 
When we examine the recent election results, vote distribution between the 
rightist and the leftist parties is almost the same as the proportions given by 
Sayari (see Table 2). 
 
Another characteristic of the party system since 1990 is the broad ideological 
spectrum of the system (Sayari 2002:10). Since 1991, extremist parties are 
getting more powerful than before. During the last elections, which were held 
on November 3, 2002, two openly Islamic parties and an ethnically based pro-
Kurdish party participated in the elections. 
 
“Since 1991, the country has witnessed the burgeoning of an Islamic 
party to the point where its leader was able to become prime minister. 
The party emerged from the 1995 election with more votes and seats 
than any other party, roughly twice the highest proportion it had 
achieved in the past. The extreme rightist Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) emerged as the second largest in 1999 and joined in coalition 
with Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Motherland Party (ANAP).”  
(Tachau 2002:43)  
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Table 2. Share of the Vote, % * in the November 3, 2002 Election 
Party/ Party Leader 2002 1999 
Justice and Development Party
Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
34.3 - 
Republican People’s Party 
Deniz Baykal 
19.4 8.7 
True Path 
Tansu Ciller 
9.6 12 
Nationalist Action Party 
Devlet Bahceli 
8.3 18 
Young Party 
Cem Uzan 
7.3 - 
Democratic People’s Party 
Mehmet Abbasoglu 
6.2 4.8 
Motherland 
Mesut Yilmaz 
5.1 13.2 
Felicity 
Recai Kutan 
2.5 15.4 ** 
New Turkey Party 
Ismail Cem 
1.2 - 
Democratic Left 
Bulent Ecevit 
1.1 22.2 
Others 5 6 
Source: The Economist, 9 – 15 November 2002 
 
Non-electoral forces (i.e. policies of the military and bureaucratic elites, 
electoral laws, and the actions of party elites) have been equally important in 
shaping the party system in Turkey as well as mass electoral behaviour. The 
efforts of the military and bureaucratic elites have shaped the system from 
above by banning some parties, removing their leaders from political activity, 
and altering the constitutional context of party activities. In this respect, the 
Turkish experience is totally different from the Western European experience 
(Sayari 2002:25). In Western European democracies, forces come from below 
rather than the actions of the state elites from above. Social cleavages have 
played a major role in political party and voting behaviour in Europe (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967:14-21). On the other hand:  
 
“there is ‘a de facto dual-track government’ in contemporary Turkey 
in which the elected political leaders are constrained to operate within 
parameters maintained by the military”  
(Lowry 2000 cf. Tachau 2002:50)  
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The military exercises power through the National Security Council, a 
constitutional body which consists of civilians and officers (Tachau 2002:50). 
 
EFFECTS OF THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS ON THE RISE OF 
THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP) 
Turkey, one of the second wave democratising countries, is accepted as a non-
liberal electoral democratic country by academic circles. From its 
characteristics, Turkish democracy reflects Schumpeter’s definition of 
democracy but is still far from both Held’s and Linz’s definitions.  
 
Turkey clearly has many of the characteristics of a non-liberal electoral 
democratic regime. On the one hand, it has a history of more than fifteen 
multiparty elections, decades of parliamentary rule and universal suffrage.  On 
the other hand, the political system does have some defects. One of the most 
visible examples of this is the hidden domination of the military. Compared to 
first wave countries of the democratisation process, the Turkish democratisation 
process has been forced down from state elites, and has been always exposed to 
the open or hidden effects of the military, which defines itself as the main 
protector of:  
 
“the existence and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility 
of the country, and the peace and security of society”  
(Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982 cf. Tachau 2002:50)  
 
Introduction of proportional representation in 1961, 10% national threshold 
system, and the laws which led to the weakening of the local party 
organisations are all major examples of the military interventions on the 
democratisation process which have given way to the rise of the AKP.  
 
According to the election results, only two parties have seats in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly: the AKP (Justice and Development Party) with 363 
seats and the CHP (Republican People’s Party) with 178 seats. In addition to 
these two parties, there are nine independents. None of the parties in the former 
coalition government won the minimum 10% of the national vote needed to 
have seats. This triumph of the AKP is not a coincidence. The characteristics of 
the Turkish party system and related electoral behaviour since the 1970’s 
positively affected the rise of the AKP. As previously mentioned, especially 
after the 1970’s, parties and the party system have been decaying with growing 
fragmentation, ideological polarisation and high volatility (Ozbudun 2000:73). 
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In the last election, former governments were punished severely by Turkish 
voters, the majority of whom have accepted the AKP as a “clean party” - the 
Turkish initials, “A” and “K” (AK), mean white or clean in the Turkish 
language. The elections results show the fact that the majority of the volatile 
votes have gone to the AKP as protest votes. Protest voting, which is the typical 
basis for extremist movements, is a danger signal for the system. Therefore, it 
reflects dissatisfaction and disillusionment with politics and often the political 
system itself (Tachau 2002:33). As is evident in this election, protest votes 
supported the Islamic party instead of other moderate alternatives which entered 
Turkish politics as new alternatives to the old centrist-right and social 
democratic parties just before the last elections.  
 
In the Turkish case, the major reasons for these protest votes are the ineffective 
policies of the fragmented coalition governments and increasing political 
corruption. As previously mentioned, since 1961 coalition governments have 
been dominant in Turkish politics because of the proportional representation 
system. In addition, the high level of fragmentation and ideological polarisation 
within the parliament has also led to a coalition of minority governments that 
have lacked the tools of effective governance. These fragmented coalition 
governments were far from producing constructive solutions to the social and 
economic problems of Turkish society. As a result, dissatisfaction among voters 
has increased. Moreover, a dramatic rise in political corruption, resulting from 
the colonization of state owned banks and industries by parties, threatens the 
legitimacy of the political regime on behalf of the voters (Sayari 2002:10). 
Increasing political corruption and the deprivation effects of the economic crisis 
led to the volatile votes being cast as protest votes to the AKP.  All centrist 
parties have been pushed out of the parliament so that the AKP now holds 
absolute majority within the parliament.  
 
Another important reason for the rise of the AKP is the weakening of the local 
party organisations of the centrist parties, due to the effects of the laws imposed 
by the 1980s’ military rule. The main beneficiaries of this weakening are the 
extremist parties, which had a small portion of the electorates, but which have 
become key players in Turkish politics since the beginning of the 1990s. In 
contrast to the weakening of the party organisations of the centrist parties, 
Islamic parties’ organisations, which became actively involved in Turkish 
politics after the 1990s, are getting stronger. Islamic Parties’ staff have worked 
as missionaries, particularly in ghettos of the big cities and in rural areas, where 
they have targeted people suffering from socio-economic problems which could 
not be solved by centrist parties’ policies. As a result of these strong 
organisations, they have had an enormous number of supporters from ghettos 
and rural areas.  
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As I have attempted to explain, the triumph of the AKP is not a coincidence. 
The rise of the party has its roots in the democratisation process of the country 
which began in the 1960s. The party system and election laws, which are 
mainly imposed by the military, have positively affected the rise of the AKP. 
Turkish democracy is still in the consolidation phase, and the country is far 
from being a consolidated democratic country because of the de facto dual-
track government. Turkey is now at a crossroads. The political future of the 
country cannot clearly be predicted, due to the hidden clash between the Islamic 
roots of the leading party and the Turkish military which still stands as the main 
protector of the unity and indivisibility of the country.  
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CAPACITY BUILDING FOR WTO PARTICIPATION: 
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES 
 
Kwadwo O. Frempong* 
 
 
Abstract 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has emerged as a key organ of 
governance and management of the globalising world economy. Its 
establishment as a forum for continuous negotiations on a range of trade and 
trade-related issues is creating new challenges for African countries.  An 
essential requirement of participation in the trade regime under the WTO is 
more rapid investment and overall economic growth by securing better 
market access for products. For African countries, this can be possible only if 
they can participate more effectively in the design and enforcement of trade 
rules as well as strengthening the institutional mechanism that shapes the 
trade regime on appropriate terms.  This article explores the question of why 
African countries’ participation in the WTO has been marginal and suggests 
recommendations to improve the situation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The need to build Africa’s capacity and its participation in WTO meetings and 
related fora has been iterated for long. It has been established that many African 
countries cannot participate effectively in the WTO due to their limited capacity in 
finance and human resources. 
 
The situation needs urgent help and action. Many African countries, which are 
members of the WTO, do not have a mission in Geneva, where the WTO is 
located. Even countries those that do have a mission in Geneva do not have the 
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required capacity. For instance, Congo had only one WTO official, Côte d’Ivoire 
two, Zimbabwe four, Ghana two, Mali none, and Senegal two.  Furthermore, all of 
these had very limited assistance or none at all from their capitals or back-up 
research teams. 
 
There are three core sets of competencies required for effective participation at the 
WTO process. First, a country’s delegation in Geneva should be skilled in 
negotiations and diplomacy, as it is a country’s arrowhead in pursuing national 
interests in the WTO.  Secondly, is the requirement of having key staff in national 
capitals with analytical and policy-making skills to provide operational support 
and guidance to the trade delegation in Geneva. Finally, there are requirements for 
personnel with technical, legal, political and legislative skills in trade policy 
institutions for effective participation of a country in the WTO process. 
 
The WTO is a member-driven organisation.  It has a wide and growing mandate 
therefore active participation of trade delegates is essential for its work. Among 
others, the WTO’s activities include about fifty meetings and consultations per 
week.  This requires a large, skilled and versatile delegation in Geneva. A 
country’s capacity also depends on the significance of learning by doing and the 
development of institutional memory. These attributes get diluted in inadequately 
sized delegations, which may also undergo frequent changes in staff composition. 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The establishment and functioning of the WTO is best understood through regime 
theory. Defining regimes simply in terms of explicit rules and procedures risks 
formalism, i.e. purely nominal agreements could be considered to be a regime, 
even though they had no behavioural implications.  International regimes are 
defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.  In an international society, faced with issues transcending 
the physical and political limits of nation-states, any analysis of international 
politics should be centred on issues of global governance. 
 
Regimes can occur in a given area of international relations according to the 
notion that international politics can be sub-divided. In a pluralistic society all 
individuals find their lives encompassed by many over-lapping issue-areas.  Each 
issue area can have, even if analogous, its own governance structure as a result of 
interaction of interests and powers at stake. Power in the trade issue-area, for 
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example, is not consistent with an elite theory model: the largest traders tend to 
have the greatest influence, while countries important in other domains have little 
influence. 
 
The question is why should one then bother about the WTO? On the one hand, its 
existence would be pointless if states feel free to do as they please, or if small 
states simply follow the rules announced by large states. On the other hand, the 
WTO as an organisation is not the sole source of order in the global trading 
system. 
 
The answer lies in a number of reasons for why regimes should matter. There are 
two categories of international regimes. First, those having significant powers, 
tightly controlled by states and limited in their ability to extend their authority to 
other areas. The second category consists of those which are not tightly controlled 
but have limited powers. The WTO falls in the first category, while organisations 
like the World Health Organisation fall into the second. 
 
The criticism of regime theory hinges on its specificity of legal rules and the 
broader structure of an international system. In today’s world, structural power is 
exercised through technology, market domination and the financial system.  Large 
corporations take decisions, which either extend or restrict the range of choices 
available to sovereign governments over their economic development. Thus, the 
power over outcomes in international political economy cannot be limited to that 
exercised by governments only. Structural power counts more than relational 
power. This notion goes beyond the state-centric tradition that characterises the 
regime theory. 
 
With respect to the trade-regime, critics of regime theory argued that bargaining 
and trade negotiations are related to power and thus, called for the empowerment 
of trade negotiators and trade officials in the political system. In this respect, the 
following perspectives of empowerment are important: 
¾ Personal: developing a sense of self and individual confidence and 
capacity, and undoing the effects of internalised oppression. 
¾ Relational: developing the ability to negotiate and influence the nature of a 
relationship and decisions made within it. 
¾ Collectiveness: where individuals work together to achieve a greater 
impact than each could have done alone. This includes involvement in 
political structures, but might also cover collective action based on co-
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operation rather than competition. Collective action may be locally focused 
or more institutionalised as happens in the United Nations or the WTO. 
 
African countries’ participation in the global trade regime under the WTO should 
be analysed by taking into account these perspectives of empowerment. 
 
THE REALITIES 
To date, Africa has derived minimal benefits from the multilateral trading system 
under the auspices of the WTO. Africa’s participation in the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations was very minimal.  A study by the African 
Economic Research Consortium revealed that the participation of African 
countries in the rules-making exercises during the WTO ministerial conferences 
was marginal, largely because these countries lacked the capacity to engage 
substantively on a wide range of issues on the agenda.  They were overwhelmed 
by the complexities of negotiations and lacked negotiating experience and 
expertise in economic policy analyses and international trade law. A case in point 
was their inability to seek credit during negotiations for measures already 
undertaken under Structural Adjustment Programmes that included trade reforms. 
 
African countries had seldom chosen to "bind tariffs" even though they could have 
received negotiation credits for having done so, as some Latin American countries 
did.  Furthermore, the focus of African countries was on preserving or enhancing 
the generalised system of preferences (GSP) or Lome Convention’s Tariff 
Preference, not fully appreciating that in the long run these provisions would have 
to be WTO compliant. 
 
A key factor behind the unbalanced nature of the Uruguay Round agreements has 
been the unequal negotiating power of members. Even today, there is not much 
change in the situation. Many developing and least developed countries are under-
represented, or even totally unrepresented, in the day-to-day activities of the 
WTO.  The WTO procedures rely on consensus for decision-making but, in 
practice, smaller countries cannot wield a veto and are therefore effectively 
disenfranchised. Much is decided in a multitude of committees, where many 
developing countries even if they could attend, would be outmanoeuvred 
technically and politically. Furthermore, there are approximately fifty WTO 
meetings a week, meaning that even when developing countries are represented in 
Geneva, they cannot participate in many discussions relevant to their countries’ 
trade interest. 
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Another appalling situation is regarding trade policy making in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For many countries, it is not well defined and, more often than not, several 
ministries and institutions handle trade policy issues. The situation becomes much 
more complex when dealing with issues of multilateral negotiations, where both 
political and commercial diplomacy are involved. This brings in the ministry of 
foreign affairs and at times in some countries, the process of multilateral 
negotiation is conducted mainly through the ministry of foreign affairs. 
 
Participation is likely to be weaker if foreign ministry officials are not aware of the 
issues. For example, the participation of Kenya in the Uruguay Round has been 
described by local policymakers as lacking in commitment and displaying an 
apathetic attitude towards the negotiations.  They further note that representation 
at the ambassadorial level did not provide the needed technical competence and 
the specialisation required for negotiations. 
 
A civil servant from Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and Industry represented the 
country at the WTO meetings. In other countries, trade policy matters are dealt 
through the ministry of trade but decisions are cleared through the cabinet. Since 
implementation of trade policies is through various ministries, co-ordination is 
often problematic.  There are significant differences between Sub-Saharan African 
countries regarding the location of real, as compared to nominal, authority with 
respect to articulation and implementation of trade policy. 
 
Also, there are differences in terms of which institution has the responsibility for 
trade policy and which government agency has the power to negotiate and sign 
international agreements. For example, in Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce has a role in trade policy matters but does not appear to have the 
eminence. It is the Industrial Tariff Committee, which advises the Ministry of 
Finance in setting tariffs and other import surcharges as well as the granting of 
tariff exemptions. 
 
In Senegal, trade measures are generally the subject of consultation among a host 
of ministries and departments and the Ministry of Trade, in principle, serves as the 
co-ordinator. In reality, however, the Ministry of Finance assumes control with 
respect to tax-related matters.  Since trade taxes constitute a major component of 
the national budget, the Ministry of Finance in effect assumes a major role in trade 
policy formation and implementation. In countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, the same pattern prevails. 
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Africa’s Plight in the International Economic System 
‘According to a report of the World Bank, Africa’s share of world commodity 
trade has fallen as a result of wrong-headed policies. For example, high tariff 
barriers made inputs expensive and added to production costs. That path 
proved an expensive failure. 
If Africa had maintained its share of world trade from the late 1960s, its 
exports and income would be some $70bn higher today. But another statistic 
stands out from the report. Agricultural subsidies in the developed industrial 
member states of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) total $300bn a year, which is equal to Africa’s entire annual 
income. 
No single measure to assist Africa’s battle to recover would provide a greater 
incentive, and have a greater impact, than reducing this support and opening 
up this market for African products. Lower tariffs on processed agricultural 
products would be an important benefit, making it easier for African countries 
to add value to their natural products, and improving prospects for agro-
industry. 
Change is under way. There is recognition of the need for greater transparency 
in government, and general acceptance of market-driven prices and exchange 
rates. But it is also critical to help Africa to negotiate WTO regulations, and 
then to apply them. Rules seen to be imposed by an alien organisation will 
never be enacted with enthusiasm. 
Africa’s recovery is a two-way process. The biggest challenge is at home. Good 
governance is critical. Giving them better access to the developed world’s 
markets is an urgent and essential step. 
                             Source: Financial Times, London, UK;  1.6.2000 
 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the situation of the African trade missions in Geneva. It is 
important to keep in mind that these figures provide a rough approximation of the 
number of officials actually available to work directly on WTO issues.  The vast 
majority of them are obliged to spend some of their time with other international 
organisations in Geneva and thus cannot dedicate more time to activities in the 
WTO.  Several delegations have personnel whose principal functions involve 
support activities (communication, accounting etc) but are occasionally called 
upon to cover WTO meetings during busy periods and perhaps only with a 
listening brief. 
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Table 1. African Trade Missions in Geneva, Switzerland 
No. Country Number of  
Represenatives1 
Population2 GDP/Capita3
1 Angola 3 12.1 523 
2 Benin 0 5.8 405 
3 Botswana 0 1.6 6 103 
 4 Burkina Faso 0 11.3 249 
5 Burundi 2 6.5 149 
6 Cameroon 3 14.3 1 474 
7 Central African Republic 0 3.5 340 
8 Chad 0 7.3 231 
9 Congo 2 2.8 995 
10 Côte d’Ivoire 2 14.3 1 598 
11 Democratic Republic of Congo 1 49.1 124 
12 Djibouti 1 0.6 757 
13 Gabon 2 1.2 6 353 
14 Gambia 0 1.2 1 453 
15 Ghana 3 19.2 1 735 
16 Guinea 2 7.3 573 
17 Guinea Bissau 0 1.2 173 
18 Kenya 3 29.0 980 
19 Lesotho 1 2.1 485 
20 Madagascar 3 15.1 231 
21 Malawi 0 10.4 169 
22 Mali 0 10.7 264 
23 Mauritania 1 2.5 478 
24 Mauritius 5 1.1 8 312 
25 Mozambique 0 18.9 169 
26 Namibia 0 1.7 5 176 
27 Niger 0 10.1 216 
28 Nigeria 6 106.4 795 
29 Rwanda 3 6.6 279 
30 Senegal 2 9.0 1 307 
31 Sierra Leone 0 4.6 160 
32 Swaziland 0 1.0 3 816 
33 Tanzania 5 32.1 173 
34 Togo 0 4.4 337 
35 Uganda 5 20.6 338 
36 Zambia 4 8.8 427 
37 Zimbabwe 4 11.4 3 669 
Note: 1) Number of representatives (as of August 2001); 2) In million and data for 1998;  
3) In 1995 US dollars and data for 1998 
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Many African countries (fifteen in total) do not have a resident delegate in Geneva 
and four maintain one-person offices. For example, in one mission, four people 
spent 100 percent of their time on WTO work, and in two others there were two 
delegates who spent 95-100 per cent of their time on WTO work. In five missions, 
the figures were 40 and 80 percent, with the number of full time equivalent 
officials ranging from 0.75-2.1 (compared to two or three officials as mentioned in 
the directory). Finally, in two delegations the range was from 10-25 percent, i.e. 
each of them was giving only one quarter of the full time equivalent person 
working on WTO matters. 
 
Priority subject areas were: the Committee on Trade and Development, as listed 
by nine out of eleven delegates; market access and agriculture were mentioned by 
eight; and the Committee on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) and dispute settlement were mentioned by six. 
 
Moreover, virtually all of the Sub-Saharan African missions in Geneva are staffed 
by officials from the ministry of foreign affairs rather than from the ministry of 
commerce and trade. That is, they are staffed by people who have little or nothing 
to do with WTO matters when they return to their homeland. This means not only 
do they know nothing about WTO work when they arrive, but that the WTO 
experience they gain while in Geneva is not likely to be used when they return 
home. 
 
Any meaningful effort to improve the participation of Sub-Saharan African 
countries in the WTO must deal with this problem. An interesting example comes 
from the list of officials who were selected by their countries to attend the trade 
policy course in Geneva, 2001. Togo selected a customs officer, Ghana, a civil 
servant, Benin a tax officer. These officials play a very little role in the 
implementation of trade policies in their countries and this means that they go 
home with little to put back into the system. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The WTO agreements and their operation are and will have a profound impact on 
the economies of African countries. Hence, it is imperative that they do not remain 
indifferent and handicapped, but actively participate in the negotiations and other 
activities in this forum and make themselves effective in its decision-making and 
operations. 
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The current process of being pushed into making one-sided concessions or facing 
a sudden collapse at the end should naturally be changed to one of engaging in a 
meaningful negotiation of give and take and insisting on commensurate 
concessions from others before finally agreeing to any concession from one’s own 
side. Opposition and resistance to harmful proposals is legitimate, and whenever a 
decision is taken to yield, it should be done in a proper and planned manner, after 
negotiating for commensurate concessions from the beneficiaries of the proposal. 
Thus, the need for effective regional alliances arises. 
 
All this requires the support of a detailed analytical examination of the issues 
involved and identification of interests. The African Group should undertake such 
an examination, but their capacity is limited. They should build and strengthen 
their capacity through empowerment schemes. The universities and institutions in 
their countries could sponsor this work. A network of institutions in developing 
countries should be formed for this purpose. But considering the limited resources 
and capacity in these nations, it is doubtful if they will be able to undertake studies 
and analyses of their own, and on a sustained basis. 
 
Earlier, particularly during the Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) undertook technical assistance programmes to help empower the 
developing countries in the negotiations. UNCTAD is still engaged in studying the 
subjects and issues relating to the WTO, but its work in this area is mainly centred 
on the inter-governmental meetings. 
 
By taking into account the political economy of regime and empowerment theories 
and the situation as described above, the following recommendations are made for 
effective participation of African countries in the WTO. First, they have to identify 
specific interests and objectives in respect of the subjects of the WTO. This can be 
done through a broad-based and in-depth examination of the issues and 
implications. It also requires some institutional changes in the decision-making 
process. WTO matters are complex with widespread implications and any 
particular ministry in a government would not be fully equipped to handle them. 
Almost every issue being taken up in the WTO involves different interests of 
various wings of the government. They also involve a c1ash of interests among 
various industry groups and economic operators. These subjects demand a very 
comprehensive examination of their implications and the balancing of differing 
interests. A government ministry working in the traditional manner is hardly 
equipped to perform this task. 
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Secondly, it is necessary to have a permanent expert body of high standing 
credibility and objectivity to supplement the efforts of the current machinery. This 
body should examine the issues critically, taking into account all aspects and 
interests, and should hold wide consultations with the affected groups in trade and 
industry, consumer fora, various wings of the government and other interested 
groups and persons. 
 
Thirdly, there should be a change in the African countries’ strategy and approach. 
The current feeling of helplessness, that they cannot have their say in the WTO, 
should be replaced by a perception that they can achieve their objectives if a 
number of them are united and well prepared. Developing countries make up a 
very large number in the WTO and even if one does not expect all of them to 
come together on all the issues, one can at least expect a large number of them to 
have a common perception and common stand on a number of issues. 
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